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CIRCUMSCRIBING EMBEDDED IMPLICATIONS 
(WITHOUT STRATIFICATIONS) 
L. THORNE MCCARTY 
D This paper is a study of circumscription, not in classical ogic, as usual, but 
in intuitionistic logic. We first review the intuitionistic circumscription of 
Horn clause logic programs, which was discussed in previous work, and we 
then consider the larger class of embedded implications. The ordinary 
circumscription axiom turns out to be inappropriate for this class of rules, 
and we analyze two alternatives: (1) prioritized circumscription, which 
works for stratified embedded implications; (2) partial circumscription, 
which is independent of the stratification. We then show that these two 
approaches coincide by identifying a single structure that serves as the 
jinal Krpke model for both circumscription axioms. This means that 
prioritized circumscription and partial circumscription entail exactly the 
same set of implicational queries. Several applications of these ideas are 
described, including (1) an interpretation of negation-as-failure, (2) a 
formalization of indefinite reasoning with definite rules, and (3) a method- 
ology for analyzing inductive properties of PROLOG programs. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
McCarthy’s theory of circumscription [33, 341 has been thoroughly investigated for 
a number of years, but it appears that all of these investigations have been 
conducted within the framework of classical ogic. In this paper, we take a different 
approach: We analyze the circumscription axiom as a sentence in second-order 
intuitionistic logic, and we apply it to a class of formulae called embedded implica- 
tions. We show that this variant of circumscription has interesting properties and 
potentially useful applications. 
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Intuitionistic embedded implications have been proposed by various researchers 
[19, 18, 35, 36, 44, 101 as a natural extension of Horn clause logic. Recall that a 
positive Horn clause is an implication with an atomic conclusion and with an 
antecedent consisting of a (possibly empty) conjunction of atomic formulae. An 
embedded implication, as the name suggests, may have a Horn clause itself 
“embedded” in its antecedent. For example: 
NearGraduate( s, d) = Student( s) A Department(d) A Course(c) A 
[ Graduate( s, d) e Take( s, c)] . 
(1) 
This rule should be read: “Student s is a near graduate of department d if there 
exists some course c such that, if s had taken c, then s would be a graduate of d.” 
Universal quantifiers appear (implicitly) at the top level in this example, but it is 
also possible to write embedded universal quantifiers. For example: 
Easy(d) *Department(d) A 
(Vs) [NearGraduate( s, d) = (2) 
Student(s) A Take( s, historylOO) A Take( s, englishlOO)] . 
This rule should be read: “Department d is easy if, for all students s, if s takes 
history100 and englishlOO, then s would be a near graduate of d.” Finally, it is 
possible to write negations in both the antecedents and the consequents of these 
rules by using a special nullary predicate I to denote a contradiction, and then 
defining 7 P to be an abbreviation of I = P. For example: 
T Graduate( s, d) e Student(s) A Department(d) A Required( c, d) A 
TTake(s,c). 
(3) 
Expanding ‘ 7 Graduate’ and ‘ 7 Take’ and noting that [ I * P] = Q is equivalent 
to I = P A Q, we observe that (3) is equivalent to 
I = Graduate( s, d) A Student(s) A Department(d) A Required( c, d) A 
[I =Take(s,c)]. 
Thus (3) is just a special case of (1). 
How should embedded implications be interpreted? It is easy to see that a set 
of rules in the form (l)-(3), interpreted classically, would be equivalent to full 
first-order logic. However, interpreted intuitionistically, these rules constitute a 
proper subset of first-order logic with interesting semantic properties L3.51. Most 
significantly, a set of intuitionistic embedded implications 9 has the disjunctive 
propeq and the existential property: A disjunction of formulae, A V B, is entailed 
by 9 if and only if ~8’ kA or L%? b B, and an existentially quantified formula, 
(3x)A(x), is entailed by 5% if and only if 5%’ kA(x)fl for some ground substitution 
13. In other words, rules in the form (l)-(3) are definite r&es. 
It is primarily the disjunctive and existential properties of intuitionistic embed- 
ded implications that make them so useful for logic programming [46, 441, for 
deductive data bases [6, 8, lo], for natural language processing [47], and for certain 
forms of commonsense reasoning [7, 371. But what if we wanted to represent 
indefinite information as well? A recent paper [41] suggests a novel approach to this 
question. Imagine a two-person communication situation in which the “speaker” 
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applies a set of definite rules to a world of definite facts and then reports some 
of these definite conclusions. Assume it is our job (as the “hearer”) to make 
inferences about the actual state of the world, even though we have not observed 
it directly. For example, the ‘physics’ department might have the following 
(simplified) graduation requirement: 
Graduate( s, physics) e Take( s, physicslOO) A 
Take( s, physics300) A (4) 
Take( s, mathematicslOO) 
Graduate( s, physics) c= Take( s, physicslOO) A 
Take( s, physics200) A (5) 
Take( s, chemistrylOO). 
Imagine that the registrar examines the transcript of a student named ‘tony,’ 
applies rules (4) and (5) and certifies that ‘tony’ is a graduate in ‘physics.’ 
Obviously, if we only know the registrar’s conclusion-‘Graduate(tony, physics)‘- 
we would not know with certainty which courses ‘tony’ took. However, we ought to 
be able to conclude from this information that ‘tony’ took ‘physicslOO’ and either 
‘mathematicslOO’ or ‘chemistrylOO.’ We would thus be doing indefinite reasoning 
with definite rules. 
Notice that there are two simplifying features in this example: First, rules (4) 
and (5) are Horn clauses. Second, they are nonrecursive Horn clauses. It is clear 
that we get the intuitively correct result in this case by turning the sufficient 
conditions in (4)-(5) into necessary conditions using Clark’s predicate comple- 
tion [12]. The argument is advanced in [41], however, that Clark’s predicate com- 
pletion does not give the intuitively correct results in the case of recursive Horn 
clauses. (We review this argument in Section 2.2 below.) Instead, McCarty and van 
der Meyden suggest hat indefinite information arises in common sense reasoning 
from the circumscription of definite rules. If we circumscribe the predicate 
‘Graduate’ in rules (4) and (51, and then ask whether the following query is entailed 
by the circumscription axiom 
Take( tony, physicslOO) ti Graduate( tony, physics), (6) 
the result is the same as the result from predicate completion. (This fact was first 
noticed by Reiter [49].) McCarty and van der Meyden suggest hat this procedure 
should also be used for recursive Horn clauses, i.e., we should circumscribe the 
defined predicates and then ask whether an implicational query, such as (6), is 
entailed by the circumscription axiom. Since circumscription is a second-order 
formalism, with no complete proof procedure, in general, this may appear to be an 
impractical proposal. However, McCarty and van der Meyden also develop two 
techniques for solving the circumscriptive query problem in certain special (but still 
second-order) cases: (1) an inductive proof procedure, which is sound but not 
complete; and (2) a decision procedure that works for an important subclass of the 
general problem. We review these results in Section 4. 
But why should this analysis be limited to recursive Horn clauses? After all, if 
definite rules in the form (l)-(3) are known to be useful in commonsense 
reasoning, and if indefinite information arises from the circumscription of definite 
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rules, then it seems natural to apply the theory of circumscription to the entire 
class of intuitionistic embedded implications. For a concrete (but nonrecursive) 
example, consider the definition of ‘NearGraduate’ in (1) combined with the 
graduation requirements for the ‘physics’ department in (4)-(5). Suppose we are 
told that ‘ran’ is a near graduate of the ‘physics’ department, according to these 
definitions. Intuitively, we ought to be able to conclude from this information that 
‘ron’ has taken at least one physics course, although we would not know which one. 
Can we formulate this query within a circumscriptive framework? 
When we begin to investigate this question in Section 5, we discover that the 
ordinary circumscription axiom does not produce the intuitively correct results, 
even for the simplest embedded implications. We then consider two alternative 
approaches to this problem. First, for the case of stratified embedded implications, 
we define a prioritized [34, 291 version of intuitionistic circumscription, in which the 
prioritization agrees with the stratification. For example, rules (4)-(5) and (1) 
are stratified, and it makes sense to circumscribe the predicates ‘Graduate’ and 
‘NearGraduate’ in that order. We study prioritized intuitionistic circumscription in 
Section 5. Second, we propose a new version of circumscription called partial 
circumscription. Roughly speaking, partial circumscription minimizes certain 
occurrences of the defined predicates in a rulebase, while leaving other occurren- 
ces alone. For example, the partial circumscription axiom would minimize the 
occurrence of ‘Graduate’ in rules (4) and (5) but not the occurrence of ‘Graduate’ 
inside the implication on the right-hand side of (1). We study partial intuitionistic 
circumscription in Section 6. 
The main result of the paper is that these two forms of circumscription coincide 
in the case of stratified rules. Specifically, we show that the prioritized circumscrip- 
tion axiom and the partial circumscription axiom entail exactly the same set of 
implicational goals in those cases in which both axioms are properly defined. This is 
an important result, since the partial circumscription axiom makes no reference at 
all to the stratification, and it is properly defined even for unstratified embedded 
implications. 
A principal technical device that we use throughout the paper is the concept of 
a jinal Ki-ipke model. Recall that the standard semantics for intuitionistic logic is 
Kripke semantics [28, 171. We say that a Kripke model K* for a set of embedded 
implications 9 is final if, given any other Kripke model K of 9, there exists a 
unique homomorphism T from K into K*. In Section 3, we define precisely the 
meaning of a homomorphism on Kripke structures, and we show that every set of 
simple embedded implications has a final Kripke model in this sense. We also show 
that a final Kripke model is genetic for implicational queries. These concepts play 
an important role in our analysis of intuitionistic circumscription. For example, in 
Section 4, we construct a final Kripke model for the circumscription of Horn clause 
logic programs. Then, in Sections 5 and 6, we show that the prioritized circum- 
scription axiom and the partial circumscription axiom have the same final Kripke 
model. This is the source of our main result that the two axioms entail the same 
implicational goals. 
Although these results on intuitionistic circumscription appear to be new, there 
are analogous results in classical ogic [30, 48, 14, 13, 311 involving the stable model 
semantics of Gelfond and Lifschitz [20]. We discuss these classical results in 
Section 7 and then compare circumscription in intuitionistic logic with circumscrip- 
tion in classical logic from a more general perspective. We suggest in Section 7 
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that there are distinct advantages to the intuitionistic approach, although this is 
ultimately a subjective question about which rational readers might disagree. 
Before proceeding to the technical details in Sections 3-6, we discuss informally 
several examples of circumscribed embedded implications, in Section 2. We also 
develop a useful classification of embedded implications in Section 2.4. Curiously, 
the ‘NearGraduate’ example that we have used throughout this introduction 
belongs to a class of embedded implications that may require yet another version 
of the circumscription axiom! We discuss this point in Section 7 and suggest hat 
intuitionistic logic can be weakened to relevance logic [2, 151 or linear logic [211 to 
handle such examples. However, we leave the details of this generalization for 
future work. 
2. EXAMPLES 
To motivate the study of circumscribed embedded implications, we present in this 
section a diverse catalogue of examples. These examples include the following: (1) 
an interpretation of negation-as-failure, in Section 2.1; (2) a formalization of 
indefinite reasoning with definite rules, in Section 2.2; and (3) a methodology for 
analyzing inductive properties of PROLOG programs, in Section 2.3. We also 
present a useful classification of embedded implications in Section 2.4. 
Most of these examples are borrowed from recent papers by the author [43, 41, 
42, 401, where they are analyzed in somewhat greater detail. The discussion in this 
section is informal. For example, we frequently use the terms “circumscription,” 
“prioritized circumscription,” and “partial circumscription” without yet giving a 
formal definition of these concepts in intuitionistic logic. We also make statements 
of the form “I) is entailed by the circumscription of P in 9” without giving 
a justification. However, once these concepts have been precisely defined (see 
Definitions 4.1, 5.1, and 6.1) and the circumscriptive query problem has been 
precisely characterized (see Corollary 4.8 and Theorems 5.4 and 6.51, the reader 
should be able to verify that these statements are correct. 
2.1. Negation-as-Failure 
We first consider the application of circumscribed embedded implications to the 
problem of negation-as-failure in logic programming [43]. Let the symbol N 
denote negation-as-failure. The basic idea is to rewrite N P as 7 P, which is 
interpreted as I = P in intuitionistic logic. (Actually, it is sufficient for these 
examples to use minimal logic [26, 171, in which I denotes a contradiction but 
is given no special status in the semantics.) We now treat I as the only 
base predicate in our language, and we circumscribe all the remaining defined 
predicates. 
We illustrate our approach with an example from [571. The following rules are 
intended to define R as the difference between the transitive closure of B and the 
transitive closure of A: 
P(x,y)(=A(x,y); (7) 
P(x,y)=A(x,z) ~P(z,y); (8) 
Q(x,y)=B(x,y); (9) 
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Q(x,y)*B(x,z) AQ(z,y); (10) 
R(x,y)-Q(x,Y) A - P(x,Y). (11) 
Suppose we add the following facts: A&2), A(2,1>, B(2,3), B(3,2). Intuitively, both 
R(3,2) and R(2,3) should be true. However, it is well known that the query 
‘R(3,2)?’ succeeds using SLDNF resolution, while the query ‘R(2,3)?’ does not 
succeed. 
We will show that this discrepancy can be explained by the difference between 
circumscription and predicate completion in intuitionistic logic. First, we rewrite 
rule (11) as an embedded implication: 
R(x,y)*Q(x,y) A [I ~P(x,Y)], (12) 
and we consider the goal I = P(x, y)8 for various substitutions 0. Suppose we 
have applied Clark’s predicate completion to rules (7) and (8) and the facts A(1,2) 
and A(2,l). In intuitionistic (or minimal) logic, we write this as 
P(x,Y) * 1 vA(x,y) v (3z)[A(x,z) A P(z,Y)] (13) 
(14) 
We also add Clark’s equational theory, i.e., we add I =[c = d] for all dis- 
tinct constants c and d in our language. It turns out that this completed theory 
entails J_ = P(3,2) but it does not entail I = P(2,3). However, if we circumscribe 
the predicates P and A in the theory consisting of the rules (7) and (8) and the facts 
A(1,2) and A(2, l), then I -P(2,3) is also entailed. Thus, predicate completion 
corresponds to SLDNF resolution in this example, while circumscription captures 
more closely our intuitions about the complement of transitive closure. 
We now extend circumscription to the full set of rules (7)-(10) and (12), plus the 
facts A(1,2), A(2, l), B(2,3), B(3,2). Since this program is stratified, we have two 
choices: prioritized circumscription or partial circumscription. Either choice gives 
us the same result, however. We have already computed the answers for the 
positive goals R(3,2) and R(2,3). So consider the negative goal I = R(x, y>0 for 
various substitutions 8. Intuitively, we would expect ‘ 1 R(1,2)?’ and ‘ 7 R(2, l)?’ to 
succeed. We would also expect ‘ 7 R(2,2)?’ to succeed, since (2,2) is in the 
transitive closure of both A and B. It turns out that the partial circumscription 
axiom (or the prioritized circumscription axiom) entails I e R(1,2), I = R(2,1), 
and _L = R(2,2). Thus, the circumscription of embedded implications appears to 
capture our intuitions about stratified negation-as-failure, at least in this example. 
To generalize this analysis to the unstratified case, we consider a pair of related 
examples. First, we examine another stratified rulebase: 
P(x) -Q(x) A R(x) A -S(x) (15) 
S(x) -Q(X) A R(x) (16) 
Q(x) eR(x) (17) 
R(x) -Q(x) (18) 
Should the query P(a) succeed ? Intuitively, this can happen only if S(a) both 
succeeds and fails, which is a contradiction. In fact, if we rewrite (15) as follows: 
P(x)c=Q(x) AR(x) A [I *S(x)], (19) 
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and apply predicate completion to (16)-(18) and (19), we can show that I eP(a) 
is entailed in intuitionistic logic. If we circumscribe these rules, of course, 
we obtain a stronger result. Again, since the program is stratified, we can use either 
prioritized circumscription or partial circumscription, and the result is the 
same: 7 P(a), 1 S(a), T Q(a), and -, R(a) are all entailed. This is also the answer 
given by the perfect model semantics [3, 481, the (two-valued) stable model 
semantics [20], and the (three-valued) well founded semantics [57]. 
Now consider a variation of this example in which the final two rules are 
unstratified: 
P(x)=Q(x) A R(x) A -S(x) (20) 
S(x) -Q(X) A R(x) (21) 
Q(x)= -R(x) (22) 
R(x)= -Q(x) (23) 
Should the query P(a) succeed? Again, this can happen only if S(a) both succeeds 
and fails, which is a contradiction. Should the query S(a) succeed? The reasoning is 
similar: S(a) succeeds only if Q(a) and R(a) both succeed, but if Q(a) succeeds, 
then R(a) fails, and vice versa. Thus S(a) should fail. In fact, if we rewrite (22) and 
(23) as follows: 
QW-11 -WI (24) 
and apply predicate completion to (19) (21), (24), and (25), we can show 
that I -P(a) and I es(a) are both entailed in intuitionistic logic. What about 
circumscription? Since the program is unstratified, we must use partial circumscrip- 
tion. We obtain the following result: First, Q(a) and R(a) are u&row~z, i.e., neither 
Q(a) nor 7 Q(a), nor R(a), nor -R(a) is entailed. However, since partial circum- 
scription is strictly stronger than predicate completion, ,P(a) and ,S(a) are both 
entailed here by the partial circumscription of the program. 
This latter conclusion contrasts with the answers given by several alternative 
approaches to negation-as-failure. The (two-valued) stable model semantics [20] 
gives no answer at all, since rules (20)-(23) do not have a unique stable model. The 
(three-valued) well-founded semantics [57] declares P(a) and S(a), as well as Q(a) 
and R(a), to be unknown. We let the reader decide which answers, if any, are 
intuitively correct. 
We will discuss the stable model semantics further in Section 7 and compare it 
to the semantics of partial intuitionistic circumscription, drawing upon the results 
in [43]. We will also present another example in Section 7 to illustrate the 
differences between these two approaches to negation-as-failure. 
2.2. Indefinite Reasoning with Definite Rules 
In the previous section, we assumed that I was the only base predicate in our 
language, and all other predicates were defined. This is a “closed world” assump- 
tion, essentially. We now adopt an “open world” assumption by allowing additional 
base predicates. The main examples in this section are borrowed from [41] and [42]. 
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Consider a world with the following base predicates: Block, On, Red, and 
Green. Using just these base predicates, we write the following definitions: 
ChristmasBlock( x) * Block(x) A Red( x) ; 
ChristmasBlock( x) + Block( x) A Green(x) ; 
OnCB( x, y) = ChristmasBlock( x) A ChristmasBlock( y) 
AOn(x,y); 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
AboveCB( x, y) c= OnCB( x, y); (29) 
AboveCB(x,y)(=OnCB(x,z) AAboveCB(z,y). (30) 
Intuitively, rules (26) and (27) define the concept of a ‘ChristmasBlock,’ and rules 
(28)~(30) define the concept of a stack of ‘ChristmasBlocks.’ Now suppose some- 
one tells us that there exists a stack of ‘ChristmasBlocks’ in which block ‘a’ is above 
block ‘b,’ according to these definitions. Query: Is there something on ‘b’? Suppose 
someone tells us, in addition, that ‘a’ and ‘b’ are painted green and red, respec- 
tively. Query: Is there something green on something red? Intuitively, the answer to 
both queries should be: Yes. However, if we formalize this problem using Clark’s 
predicate completion, the answer is: No. 
To see this, note that the “only if’ half of rules (29) and (30) would be written as 
follows: 
AboveCB( x, y) * OnCB( x, y) V 
(32) [OnCB( x, z) A AboveCB( z, y)] . 
(31) 
But consider a model in which the following infinite sequence of ‘AboveCB’ 
relations is true: 
AboveCB( a, b) , 
OnCB(a,c,), AboveCB( c 1, b) , 
OnCB(c,,c,), AboveCB( c 2, b) , 
OnCB(c,,c,), AboveCB( c 3, b) , 
It is easy to see that this model satisfies (31). Furthermore, if we add all relations in 
the form {AboveCB(a, c,)Ji E w} and {AboveCB(c,, c,)li, j E w, i <j}, then rules (29) 
and (30) are satisfied as well. But note that there is no relation here in the form 
‘OnCB(w, b),’ i.e., there is nothing on ‘b.’ To complete our model, we now copy the 
relation ‘OnCB’ into the relation ‘On’ and we add ‘Green(a)’ and {Green(c,)li E wl 
to the model along with ‘Red(b).’ We have thus constructed a countermodel to 
both queries. 
The problem here is similar to the problem encountered in the analysis of rules 
(7)~(11) in Section 2.1. In general, since transitive closure cannot be defined in 
first-order logic [l], there is no set of first-order sentences that will give us the 
intuitively correct answer to these queries. The solution here is also similar to the 
solution in Section 2.1: We circumsctibe the predicates ‘ChristmasBlock,’ ‘OnCB,’ 
and ‘AboveCB’ in rules (26)-(30). Then, to pose our first query, we add the 
CIRCUMSCRIBING EMBEDDED IMPLICATIONS 331 
following auxiliary definition to our rulebase: 
Covered(x) e On( w, x) (32) 
and ask whether the implication 
Covered(b) = AboveCB( a, b) (33) 
is entailed by the circumscription axiom plus (321. To pose our second query, we 
add the following auxiliary definition to our rulebase: 
GreenOnRed = On( x, y ) A Green( x) A Red( y ) (34) 
and ask whether the implication 
GreenOnRed e AboveCB( a, b) A Green(a) A Red(b) (35) 
is entailed by the circumscription axiom plus (34). In both cases, the answer is: Yes. 
For a further discussion of this example, see [41]. 
We now consider a variant of the ‘ChristmasBlock’ example that makes use of 
circumscribed embedded implications as well as circumscribed Horn clauses. We 
first write down a simpler version of rules (29) and (30), in which ‘Above’ is just the 
transitive closure of ‘On’: 
Above(x,y)eOn(x,y); 
Above(x,y)kOn(x,z) r\Above(z,y). 
We then define 
(36) 
(37) 
GreenTower( x) = Green( x) A (Vz) [Green( z) =Above( z, x)] . (38) 
Intuitively, ‘GreenTower( is true if “there exists a pile of all green blocks with x 
at the bottom.” We now circumscribe the defined predicates ‘Above’ and ‘Green- 
Tower’ in two different ways. For prioritized circumscription, we put ‘Above’ in 
the first stratum and ‘GreenTower’ in the second stratum, and circumscribe the 
predicates in that order. For partial circumscription, we circumscribe the occur- 
rences of ‘Above’ in rules (36) and (37) and the occurrence of ‘GreenTower’ in rule 
(38), but we leave the occurrence of ‘Above’ in rule (38) outside the scope of the 
circumscription axiom. (We will see exactly how to do this in Section 6.) Now 
consider the query: 
(Vx , y ) [ GreenTower( x) * Above( x, y ) A GreenTower( y )] . 
Intuitively, this query should be true. On the other hand, the query: 
(39) 
(Vx, y ) [ GreenTower( y ) * Green(y) A On( x, y) A GreenTower( x)] (40) 
should not be true, since there could be additional “towers” on y that are not 
all green. It turns out that these are precisely the results obtained from either 
the prioritized or the partial circumscription axiom. We will discuss these results 
further in Section 7. 
A further variant of this example shows how to combine the base predicate I 
with other base predicates such as ‘On’ and ‘Green.’ For this, it is necessary to 
use intuitionistic rather than minimal negation [171. We thus stipulate that every 
proposition is entailed by 1. (To do this, using Kripke semantics, as presented in 
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Section 3, we simply insist that I is never “forced” at any state in any Kripke 
model.) Suppose we adopt the definition of ‘Covered’ in rule (32), and then define: 
Clear(~) c= [ I = Covered(~)] . 
Consider the query 
(41) 
(Vy ) [ GreenTower( y ) e Green( y) A Clear(y)] . (42) 
Intuitively, this query should be true: If there is nothing on y, then everything 
above y is green. In our formalization, we would circumscribe ‘Covered’ and 
‘Clear’ as well as ‘Above’ and ‘GreenTower,’ and again we could use either 
prioritized or partial circumscription. It turns out, once again, that query (42) is 
entailed by either version of the circumscription axiom, as long as negation is 
interpreted intuitionistically. 
An extension of these ideas to a language for the representation of actions is 
presented in [42]. Suppose we have a set of basic actions: ‘A(x, t,, t2)‘, ‘B(x, y, t,, t2)), 
‘C(y, t2Y, in which x and y are object variables and t, and t, are order variables. 
Intuitively, ‘A(x, t,, t2)’ asserts that some observable fact about n is true over the 
time interval from t, to t,. We now add abstract actions: ‘P(x, t,, t2Y, ‘R(x, y, t,, t2)‘, 
etc. Abstract actions are defined by Horn clauses that are allowed to contain order 
rehtions in their antecedents. For example, we could define ‘P(x, t,, tz)’ as follows: 
P(x,t,,t,)~A(x,t,,t,) At, <t,, (43) 
P(x,t,,t*)~A(x,tl,t3) AP(x,t,,t,) At, <t,<t,. (44) 
The relation t, < t, is interpreted over a linear order, and it means “t, is strictly 
less than t,.” In other words, < is both transitive and irreflexive, and it satisfies 
the disjunctive constraint t, <t, V t, = t, V t, <t,. 
We can now proceed exactly as we did with the ‘ChristmasBlock’ and ‘Green- 
Tower’ examples. If we have actually observed a sequence of actions 
A(mary,t,,t,),A(mary,t,,t,),...,A(mary,t,-,,t,), 
we can apply rules (43) and (44) and conclude that P(mary, t 1, t ,,I is true. Conversely, 
we can circumscribe the predicate P in rules (43) and (441, so that P(mary, t i, t,) is 
equivalent to the assertion that ‘mary’ performs the action ‘A’ some finite-but 
indefinite-number of times in the interval from t, to t,. We thus have a 
mechanism for representing repetitive actions. For a more complex example, 
including actions that are concurrent as well as repetitive, the reader should consult 
the problem in [42] entitled “Mermaids Get the Sack.” The “Radioactive Robot” 
problem, also in [42], shows how to combine concurrent and repetitive actions with 
a particular version of the closed world assumption. Finally, we note that it is 
possible to add general embedded implications to our representation of indefinite 
actions, by analogy to the use of embedded implications in the ‘GreenTower’ 
example. However, a full discussion of these features of the action language is 
beyond the scope of the present paper. 
2.3. Inductive Properties of PROLOG Programs 
So far, our examples have all been function-free, i.e., DATALOG programs. But 
the circumscription of embedded implications works just as well with function 
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symbols as without. We illustrate this point by an analysis of certain inductive 
properties of PROLOG programs. These ideas are discussed further in [40]. 
We first consider an example that has often been analyzed in the literature 127, 
161. Is naive reverse a symmetric relation? We use the following definition of naive 
reverse: 
Append(ni1, I, I) (= (45) 
Append([kll],m,[kln])~Append(l,m,n) (46) 
Reverse( nil, nil) = (47) 
Reverse([qlr],p)=Reverse(r,s) ~Append(s,[q],p) (48) 
The property of being a symmetric relation can be represented as a universally 
quantified implication: 
(Vx,y)[Reverse(y,x)=Reverse(x,y)]. (49) 
Obviously, (49) does not follow from (45)-(48), nor does it follow from (45)-(48) 
augmented by Clark’s predicate completion. Instead, we have to circumscribe the 
predicates ‘Append’ and ‘Reverse’ in (45)-(48) and ask whether (491 is entailed by 
the circumscription axiom. The answer is: Yes. .The inductive proof procedure 
presented in [41] also works in this case, giving the correct answer after two 
inductive steps. For a more detailed discussion of this example, see [40]. 
We now consider an alternative definition of ‘Reverse,’ suggested by an example 
in 1451. Suppose we have the following auxiliary rules: 
Rev(nil,p) =Base(nil,p); (50) 
Rev([qlr],p)~Rev(r,[qlpl). (51) 
We take ‘Base’ to be a base predicate, and we circumscribe the predicate ‘Rev’ in 
(50) and (51). Consider the following definition: 
Reverse( u, w) = [Base( nil, w) = Rev( u, nil)] . (52) 
The implication on the right-hand side of (52) is similar to the implicational goals 
we have seen previously in (0, (33), (35), and (39). In this case, we are asserting the 
defined predicate, Rev(u, nil), and we are asking whether Basefnil, w) is entailed by 
the circumscription of ‘Rev’ in (50)-(51). If so, then u must be the reverse of w. 
But we can now take a further step and circumscribe the predicate ‘Reverse’ in 
(52). This enables us to ask: Is our new definition of ‘Reverse’ symmetric? In other 
words, does the partial (or prioritized) circumscription of ‘Rev’ and ‘Reverse’ in 
(50)-(51) and (52) entail (49)? Intuitively, the answer should be: Yes. 
Note also that there is another possible definition of ‘Reverse’ in which the 
predicates ‘Base’ and ‘Rev’ are interchanged: 
Reverse( u, w) (= [Rev( u, nil) * Base(ni1, w)] . (53) 
This is an ordinary embedded implication, which does not require the use of 
circumscription on the right-hand side. However, we could still ask whether 
the circumscription of ‘Reverse’ in (50)-(51) and (53) entails (49). Intuitively, the 
answer should be: Yes. The difference between (52) and (53) will be discussed in 
the following section. 
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2.4. A Classification of Embedded Implications 
Throughout this discussion, we have assumed an informal understanding of the 
class of embedded implications. Here is a formal definition: 
Definition 2.1. 
l An atomic formula is an embedded implication. 
l If A is an atomic formula and JZ?,, . . . , dk are embedded implications, then 
A=J;4,r\ *** A&~ is an embedded implication. 
. If d(x) is an embedded implication, then (tlx).&x) is an embedded 
implication. 
This definition allows implications to be embedded to an arbitrary depth. However, 
all the examples we have seen in this paper have been restricted to the class of 
simple embedded implications, in which implications are nested at most one deep. 
More precisely, a simple embedded implication is a rule in the form 
where each g(x) is either an atomic formula or a Horn clause. This is not a 
limitation of expressive power, since arbitrary embeddings can be simulated by 
defining new atomic predicates using simple embedded implications exclusively. 
We therefore restrict our attention to the class of simple embedded implications 
for the remainder of the paper. 
There are other syntactic restrictions, which do have an effect on expressive 
power, as Bonner and co-workers have shown. Consider just the function-free 
(DATALOG) case, and apply the concept of expressibility developed by Chandra 
and Hare1 for database query languages [ll]. If we combine stratified negation- 
as-failure with intuitionistic embedded implications [9], we have a language that 
can express any database query in RE [lo]. If we then restrict the class of 
embedded implications by disallowing embedded universal quantifiers, we have a 
language that expresses exactly the database queries in PSPACE [6]. Additional 
syntactic restrictions give us a family of languages that can express the database 
queries at each level of the polynomial hierarchy above P [8]. These results are for 
ordinary embedded implications, i.e., embedded implications without any use of 
circumscription. As soon as circumscription is added, the complexity is no longer in 
RE, except for the special cases cited in Section 4. Thus the distinctions analyzed 
by Bonner and co-workers are not very important for our present purposes. In fact, 
we freely use the most general version of the language in this classification scheme, 
i.e., we allow unrestricted embedded universal quantifiers in our rules. 
One important distinction, however, is the distinction between base and defined 
predicates. We say that an implication embedded on the right-hand side of a rule 
has a base conclusion if its consequent is a base predicate. For example, all 
the implications encoding negation-as-failure in Section 2.1 have base conclu- 
sions, since I is a base predicate. Otherwise, we say that the implication has a 
defined conclusion. For example, the implication in rule (D-the definition of 
‘NearGraduate’-has a defined conclusion. This distinction is illustrated sharply by 
the two different encodings of ‘Reverse’ in rule (52) and rule (53) in Section 2.3. 
We will see that a related distinction, applied to implicational queries, is important 
for the decidability results cited in Section 4. 
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We have already emphasized the distinction between stratified and unstratified 
rulebases, but this distinction obviously interacts with the distinction between base 
conclusions and defined conclusions. The only examples of unstratified rules that 
we have seen so far are in Section 2.1, and since the implications in these rules all 
have base conclusions, the concept of stratification is the same here as in the 
literature on stratified negation-as-failure [3]. With defined conclusions, there are 
many more possibilities. We can write bizarre examples, such as 
Here, there are violations of stratification through the consequents of the implica- 
tions on the right-hand side, as well as violations of stratification through the 
antecedents. What does this mean? Can we give a plausible interpretation to the 
circumscription of P, Q, and R in this set of rules? Should we even try? 
To avoid such questions in the present paper, we simply ignore this most general 
case. Our strategy is to proceed, cautiously, through the easier cases. We thus 
consider the following: (1) ordinary Horn clauses, in Section 4; (2) stratified 
embedded implications with base conclusions, in Section 5; and (3) unstrati- 
fied embedded implications with base conclusions, in Section 6. As mentioned, we 
allow embedded universal quantifiers without restriction in Sections 5 and 6. 
However, we will not analyze embedded implications with defined conclusions in 
the present paper. Although we discuss the ‘NearGraduate’ example briefly in 
Section 7, a full analysis is reserved for future work. 
3. FINAL KRIPKE MODELS 
We begin with some technical background. We assume that the reader is generally 
familiar with the Kripke semantics for first-order intuitionistic logic, as given in [281 
and [17], and we simply review our notation here. Our main objective in this 
section is to define the concept of a final Kripke model and to state some of the 
results that will be needed in subsequent sections of the paper. These results 
are extracted from E351. They are stated here without proof, but full proofs are 
available in Appendix B in [39]. 
Let _?Z be a first-order language with function symbols but without equality, and 
let _Y(c) be the language _Y augmented by an arbitrary set of new constants c. For 
simplicity, we will assume that c is countable. We write a Kripke structure for _Y as 
a quadruple (K, I, h, u), where K is a nonempty set of states, I is a partial order 
on K, and u is a monotonic mapping from the states of K to nonempty sets of 
individual constants in p(c). Intuitively, the third component, h, tells us the 
ground atomic formulae that are true at each state of K. However, since we 
eventually want to extend our language to second-order, we use a slightly more 
complicated definition of h than usual. Let t(u(s)) denote the set of all variable-free 
terms that are constructible in _%’ using the constants in u(s). We first define an 
intuitionistic relation R of arity n to be a function that assigns to every state s E K 
a subset of the n-fold Cartesian product of t(u(s)) with itself, subject to the 
requirement that R(s,) cR(s,) whenever si IS,. We then define h to be a 
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mapping from the predicate constants in L? to the set of intuitionistic relations on 
K. The atomic clause of the “forcing” relation [17] is thus 
s,KI=I(tl,...,t,) iff (fl,..., t,)~h(P)(s),forPapredicate 
constant of arity n. 
The remaining clauses are defined as usual. Since we are only using embedded 
implications in this paper, we only need the following: 
s,Kb%Q?A9 iff 
s,Kl=L@*& iff 
s,K t= (VX)LZ’(X) iff 
s,KbHand s,KkB’; 
s’,K!=~impliess’K!=B’foreverys’~s 
in K, and all the individual constants in &’ and 
99 are in u(s); 
s’K g&‘(t) for every s’ 2 s in K, and 
for all terms t in t( u( s’)) . 
If s, K ~.QI for every s E K, we say that (K, I, h, u) satisfies &. If s, K &zY for every 
s E K such that the individual constants in ti are in u(s), then we say that ti is true 
in (K, I, h,u). Finally, if @ is a set of sentences and Ic, is a sentence, we write 
@ b $ if and only if 1,9 is true in every Kripke structure that satisfies @. 
Much of our work in this paper is based on homomorphic mappings among 
Kripke structures, and we now define this concept precisely. First, let L be an 
isomorphic mapping on the domains of two Kripke structures’ that is constrained 
to be an identity on the constants in 9. Write zL to mean “isomorphic under L” 
and extend this notation in the obvious way to terms and relations. We define a 
homomorphism T relative to a fixed L as follows: 
Definition 3.1. Let J1 = (J,, $,hl,ul) and J2 = (J2, +,h2,u2) be two Kripke 
structures for _Y with domain isomorphism L. A mapping 7: J1 -+ J2 is a 
homomorphism from J1 into J2 if and only if the following hold: 
1. For every s, s’ E J,, if s I, s’, then 6) s2 &‘). 
2. For every s E J1, (a) ul(s) -‘ u~(T(s)), and (b) h,(PXs) =‘ h,(P(T(s)) for 
every predicate constant P. 
The following lemmas are straightforward consequences of this definition. 
Lemma 3.2. Let r be a homomorphism _ii-om J1 = (J,, I~, h,,u,) into J2 = 
( J2, I~, h,,u,) with domain isomorphism L. Let S’ be a Horn clause in 5%~~). 
Then, for every state s E J1, 
Corollary 3.3. Let .SX’ be a Horn clause, and assume that J2 = (J,, 5, h, u> satisfies s?. 
Let J1 G J2. Then J, = (J,, I, h,u) also satisfies A?. 
PROOF. Let r in Lemma 3.2 be the identity mapping from J1 into J2. 0 
‘This is possible only because we have assumed that all Kripke structures have countable domains. 
We can relax this assumption, but we must then construct a fumdy of final Kripke structures {I&), 
one for each cardinal@ CT. The main results of the paper will still go through in this more general 
framework. 
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Lemma 3.4. Let T be a homomorphism from J1 = (J,, I,, h,, u1 > onto J2 = 
(J,, s2, h, , u2 > with domain isomolphism L. Let ZZ’ be a simple embedded implica- 
tion in _Y(cl). Then 
J1 satisfies & = J2 satisfies L(&) . 
Intuitively, homomorphisms preserve the satisfaction of simple embedded 
implications in the forward direction (Lemma 3.4), and they preserve Horn clauses 
at each state in the reverse direction (Lemma 3.2). 
We now define the concept of a final Kripke model, which is analogous to the 
concept of an initial model in classical logic [22, 321. We also define the closely 
related concept of a generic model. Let X be an arbitrary class of Kripke 
structures and assume that K = (K, 5, h, u) is a member of X 
Definition 3.5. K is a final tipke structure for A? if and only if, for every J EL%? and 
every domain isomorphism L, there exists a unique homomorphism from J 
into K. 
It is easy to see that two final Kripke structures for A? are isomorphic, and thus 
either one could be designated as “the” final Kripke structure. Now let q be a 
class of sentences. 
Dejinition 3.6. K is generic in _%? for ? if and only if, for every I,!I E q, Cc, is true in 
K if and only if Cc, is true in every J EZ 
The following proposition is a straightforward consequence of Lemma 3.2 and 
Definition 3.6: 
Proposition 3.7. Assume, for every J EX, that there exists a homomorphism (not 
necessan’ly unique) porn J into K. Let ? be the class of Horn clauses. Then K is 
genetic in Xfor *. 
In particular, any final Kripke structure for _‘%Y is generic in _%Y for q. In addition, 
a final Kripke structure has the distinct advantage of being unique up to isomor- 
phism. 
We typically use Definitions 3.5 and 3.6 and Proposition 3.7 as follows: We take 
5??’ to be the class of Kripke structures that satisfy some set of rules 9C’, and we try 
to find a final Kripke structure, K, for 555 If such a K exists, we call it the final 
fipke model for 9. Proposition 3.7 then tells us that a Horn clause is entailed by 
55’ if and only if it is true in K. We now show how this works when B? is a set of 
simple embedded implications. 
First, for any _.%$c>, let H be the set of all pairs (I, U), where U is any nonempty 
set of constants in 9(c) that includes the constants in 9, and Z is any Herbrand 
interpretation for 9 over the universe U. Set (I,, U, > I (Z,, U, > if and only if 
I, ~1~ and U, c U,. We note that H U (0,0> is a complete lattice under this 
order, and we let n and u denote the meet and join, respectively, in this lattice. 
We now identify the largest subset of H that satisfies 9’ when viewed as a Kripke 
structure. Define u,(( I, U >> = U, and define 
h,(P)((Z,U)) = {(t,,...,t,)IP(t,,...,t,) l Z) 
for every predicate constant P. Define a transformation T9 on the powerset lattice 
[2H, cl, as follows: 
338 L.T.MCCARTY 
Definition 3.8. For every J c H, put (I, U) E T,(J) if and only if the following hold: 
l (Z,U) E J, and 
l for every simple embedded implication P(x)* A;= 1 sr$x) in 9 and every 
ground substitution 8 for the variables in x restricted to the constants in U, 
P(x)~EZ if (Z,U),J!=_$(x)0 fori=l,..., k. 
Intuitively, Ts is a “deletion” operator. It examines the set J above the state 
(I, U) to see if the right-hand side of any of the rules P(x)e= A;= 1 4(x> is 
satisfied, and, if so, it deletes the state (I, U) from J unless the left-hand side of 
each of these rules is also satisfied. It is straightforward to show that Tz has the 
following two properties: 
Lemma 3.9. T9 is a monotonic transformation on the lattice [2H, ~1. 
Lemma 3.10. (J, s,h,,,u,,) satisfies A? ifand on& if J CT,(J). 
Define K* = U {J 1 J & T,(J)}. From the &raster-Tar&i fixed-point theorem 
[51], we know that K* is the greatest fixed point of T9 on the lattice [2H, ~1, and 
we thus have the following theorem: 
Theorem 3.11. (K*, s,hO,uO) is afinal ZGzpke modelfor 3’. 
PROOF. Since K* = T,(K*), it follows from Lemma 3.10 that (K*, s,hO,u,,) 
satisfies 9. Let (J, I, h, u) be any other Kripke structure that satisfies 9, and let L 
be any domain isomorphism that preserves the constants in 9’. For every s E J, 
define 
Z(s) = (P(L(tl),...,L(tn))l(tl,...,tn) -(P)(s)}, 
U(s) = L(U(S)). 
Now set r(s) = (Z(s), U(s)). It is obvious that r is a mapping into H and that 
conditions 1, 2a, and 2b of Definition 3.1 are satisfied. Thus T is a homomorphism. 
To show that r is a unique homomorphism, it is sufficient to note that two distinct 
elements of H have distinct values for either h, or uO, so that TV Z TV 
implies s1 # s2. Thus any two homomorphisms r1 and r2 must be identical at every 
s E J. 
Finally, we need to show that T is a mapping into K* and not just a mapping 
into H. To see this, let r(J) be the image of J in H. Let zzf be any simple embedded 
implication in 9. Since (J, I, h,u) satisfies &‘, we know from Lemma 3.4 that 
(r(J), I, h,,u,) satisfies ti as well. Thus, by Lemma 3.10, r(J) c T,(r(J)). Thus 
G-(J) G K* by the definition of K*. q 
Proposition 3.7 now tells us that a Horn clause is entailed by 9 if and only if it 
is true in (K*, I,h,,,u,,). 
We now state several results about the structure of (K*, 5, h,,u,) that will be 
needed in subsequent sections of the paper. These results appear in [35], but in 
a slightly different form. First, it is useful to have a generalization of the definition 
of K*: 
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Lemma 3.12. Let K’ = u { J (J c T*(J) 17 K). Then K’ is the largest subset of K such 
that (K’, <,h,,,q,) satisfies 9. 
Now, for any J, let J(s) denote the set {s’ls’ E J, s’ 2 s). For example, K*((Z, V>> 
denotes the set of states in K* that are greater than (I, U >. Using the construction 
in Lemma 3.12, we can write this as follows: 
I*) = u{JIJrT,(J) ~H((LU))} 
We now compute K*(( I, U>> using ordinal powers of T,(J) n H(( I, U>>. Define 
S,,(J) = T,(J) n H(( I, U)>, and set 
S,,, Jo=H((Z,U)), 
S,,” J a = S,,.(S,,. J PI7 for LY = /3 + 1 a successor ordinal, 
SIuJ~=n{S,.J PlP<a], foraalimitordinal. 
Proposition 3.13. There exists an ordinal (Y such that S,,v 1 LY = K*((Z, U >). 
Recall that n denotes the meet in the lattice H U (0,0>. In general, fl J would 
not be a member of J, but the following intersection property holds in K*: 
Theorem 3.14. fl S,, v 1 (Y E S,,v J (Y for every ordinal (Y. 
Corollary 3.15. fl K*(( I, U>> E K*(( I, 17)). 
Corollary 3.15 is analogous to the model intersection property of classical Horn 
clause logic L.55, 41, and it explains why embedded implications have the properties 
of definite rules. The closure ordinal in Proposition 3.13 is not, in general, equal to 
o, as shown by Examples 3.18 and 3.19 in [351. These examples also show that the 
following inequality is not, in general, an equality: 
Proposition 3.16. u { fl S,, v J kIk<w)< nS,,vIw< nK*((Z,U)). 
However, we will see in Section 4 that this inequality collapses when 9 is a set 
of Horn clauses. 
4. CIRCUMSCRIPTION 
We now begin our study of circumscription [33, 341 in intuitionistic logic. 
Throughout this section, we assume that L%? is a set of Horn clauses rather than 
a set of general embedded implications. After stating the circumscription axiom in 
Definition 4.1, we proceed to our principal objective: the construction of a final 
Kripke model for the intuitionistic circumscription of a Horn clause logic program. 
Note that Definitions 3.5 and 3.6-the definitions of final and generic Kripke 
models-refer to an arbitrary class, 3, of Kripke structures. Thus the special- 
ization of _%Y in Section 3 to the models of a set of jirst-order sentences was 
unnecessary. In this section we take _%? to be the class of Kripke structures that 
satisfy certain sentences in second-order intuitionistic logic. 
Assume that _Y is extended to a second-order language. Our first step is to add 
an explicit assignment (T to the semantic definitions to handle the predicate 
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variables, X, Y, Z, etc., thus generalizing the three-place relation s,K kd to a 
four-place relation u, s, K ba?. Specifically, we define CT to be a mapping from the 
predicate variables in 9 to the set of intuitionistic relations on K, and we add the 
following clause to the definition of the “forcing” relation: 
c~,s,KkX(t, ,..., tn) iff (tr,..., t,) ~r(X)(~),for X apredicate 
variable of arity n. 
The remaining clauses are unchanged, except that s,K LB? is replaced everywhere 
by (T, s, K k@‘. Finally, we add two clauses for the second-order quantifiers. Let uRx 
denote the assignment that is identical to r~ except that the variable X is mapped 
to the intuitionistic relation R. Using this notation, we define 
a,s,Kk (VX)d(X) iff crRx, s, K kd( X), for every intuitionistic 
relation R on K with the same arity as X, 
and similarly for the second-order existential quantifier. The definition of entail- 
ment is unchanged. This semantics is based on standard accounts of second-order 
intuitionistic logic, such as [52]. 
We now define circumscription. Let 9 be a finite set of Horn clauses, and let 
P= (P1,P*,..., Pk> be a tuple consisting of the dejined predicates that appear on 
the left-hand sides of these rules. Let S(P) denote the conjunction of the rules in 
9, with the predicate symbols in P treated as free parameters, and let 9(X> be 
the same as B’(P) but with the predicate constants (P,, P,, . . . , Pk) replaced by 
predicate variables (X,, X,, . . . , X, >. 
Definition 4.1. The circumsctiption axiom is the following sentence in second order 
intuitionistic logic: 
3(P) A (VX) S(X) A i\ (Vx) [ Xi(X) =$ P,(x)1 
[ i=l 
=+ ; (Vx) Pm =m~>l . 
i=l I 
We denote this expression by Circ(S(P>; P) and refer to it as “the circumscrip- 
tion of P in B?(P).” The axiom has the same intuitive meaning that it has in 
classical ogic. It states that the extensions of the predicates in P are as small as 
possible, given the constraint that 9(P) must be true. Since the logic is intuitionis- 
tic, however, the axiom minimizes extensions at every state of every Kripke 
structure that satisfies 9. 
We first establish a useful result similar to Lemma 3.4. Intuitively, this result 
tells us that homomorphisms preserve the satisfaction of circumscribed Horn 
clauses in the forward direction. 
Lemma 4.2. Let J, = (J,, sl,h,,ul) and J2 = (J2, &,h2,u2) be two fipke sttic- 
tures for 3 with isomorphic domains, and let r be a homomorphism from J1 onto 
J2. Let 9 be a set of Horn clauses in DE”. Then 
J, satisfies Circ( 9( P) ; P) * J2 satisfies Circ( A%?-( P) ; P) . 
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PROOF. Assume J1 satisfies Circ@‘(P); P). Then J2 satisfies 9(P), the first 
conjunct in Circ(9((P>; P), by Lemma 3.4. We thus need to show that J2 satisfies 
the second conjunct in C&(9’(P); P). 
Assume the contrary. Then there exists some assignment cz = u~~~:?.~~ and 
some state T(S) E J2 such that 
q,~(s),J2-‘(X) A i\ (vx)[Xi(x> *Pi(x)], (54) 
i=l 
and yet, for some predicate Pj in P, 
~~~7(~),J2 # (vX>[Pj(X) *Xj(X)]* (55) 
Define an assignment u1 on J, by setting cr,(X,>(s> = ~~(X~)(r(s)) for every Xi in 
X. We can now interpret J1 and J2 as a pair of Kripke structures for a language 
9’ in which the predicates X,, X,, . . . , X, have been added to the predicates in P 
and B. Moreover, if the mappings h, and h, are extended to these new predicates 
by setting h&Xi) = aI and h,(Xi) = CT~(X~) for i = 1,. . . , k, then r is still a 
homomorphism from J1 onto J2. Thus, from (54) and Lemma 3.2, we have 
u~,s,J~ kg(x) A i (‘X)[Xi(X) APi(X (56) 
i=l 
From (55) and Lemma 3.4, we have 
~I,s,J~ w (vx)[Pj(X) *Xj(X)]* (57) 
But if (56) and (57) are true, then J1 does not satisfy Circ(S’(P); PI, whit!; 
contradicts our initial assumption. q 
We now show how to construct a final Kripke model for Circ(S?(P); P) when 
S’(P) is a set of Horn clauses. We denote this Kripke model by (C*, s, h*,u*). 
The construction is similar to the construction of (K*, I, h,,u,) in Section 3, 
except that we work with Herbrand interpretations over just the base predicates, 
denoted by B. Specifically, let C* be the set of all pairs (B, U), where U is any 
nonempty set of constants in _Y(c> that includes the constants in 9, and where B 
is any Herbrand interpretation for the base predicates in ._I? over the universe U. 
The definition of 5 is the same as in K* and the definition of u* is the same as 
the definition of u,,, but the definition of h* is different. Intuitively, we want h* to 
give us the smallest Herbrand model of 9’ over the universe U that contains B. 
Formally, we do this by first defining S,(J) = T,(J, U> u J, where T,(J, U) is the 
van Emden-Kowalski [551 fixed-point operator for 9 applied to J in a universe U. 
We then define, for every predicate constant P, 
h*(P)((B,U)) = {(t,,...,t,)IP(t,,...,t,) =S:T(B)}, 
where 
S; T(B) =B, 
S$ T(B) =Su(Sb-’ T(B)), for finite k, 
S,“?(B) = u{S;~(B)lk<w}. 
We now prove the following simple, but crucial, lemma: 
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Lemma 4.3. Let (K*, I, h,,u,) be the final fipke model for 9. Then 
h*(Pi)(<B,U>) =h,(Pi)( nK*((B,U))) 
for evey predicate Pi in P. 
PROOF. We use the computation of K*((B, U)) given by Proposition 3.13. It is 
obvious that (Si t(B), U) = n S,, U J 0 = (B, U), and it is straightforward to prove 
by induction that 
($?(B),LJ)I nS,,.Ik, 
for all finite k. Combining this inequality with the inequality in Proposition 3.16, we 
have 
(%0&r/3 = u{($r(B),Lj)Ik<w) 
I u{nS,,,Iklk<w} (58) 
I nK*((B,U)). 
Now consider the transformation Ts applied to K*((B, 17)) U {(SE t(B), U>). 
According to Definition 3.8, the state (S,O t(B), U) is deleted by T9 only if one of 
the Horn clauses in 9 fails to be satisfied there, but this cannot happen because 
S,O t(B) is a fixed point of the operator T,(J, U) UJ. Thus (S,W t(B), U) is 
preserved by all ordinal powers of Tg. Thus the inequality in (58) is actually an 
equality. This completes the proof of the lemma. q 
Corollay 4.4. The mapping r(( B, U)) = n K*(( B, U>> is a homomorphism from 
(C*, s,h*,u*) into (K*, s,h,,,q,). 
The proof that (C*, I, h*, u*) is a final Kripke model has two parts. First, we 
have to show that (C*, I, h*,u*) itself satisfies Circ(S’(P>; P). Second, we have to 
show that there exists a unique homomorphism from any (J, I, h, u) that satisfies 
Circ(S?( P); P) into (C*, I, h*, u*). For the first part, we prove a slightly stronger 
result: 
Lemma 4.5. Assume that J _C C*. Then (J, I, h*, u*) satisfies the circumscription 
axiom Circ(9(P); PI. 
PROOF. Since (K*, 5, h,, u,,) satisfies 9(P), it follows from Corollary 4.4 and 
Lemma 3.2 that (J, s,h*,u*) also satisfies 9(P), which is the first conjunct in 
Circ(Z(P>; P). We thus need to show that (J, I, h*,u*) satisfies the second 
conjunct in Circ(&@P>; PI. 
Assume the contrary. Then there exists some assignment (T = gRTA:i: and 
some state s E J such that 
a,s,JbB(X) A i (Vx)[Xi(X) *Pi(X)], (59) 
i=l 
and yet, for some predicate Pj in P, 
a(Xj)(s) 'h*(q)(S)- (60) 
In other words, a( Xi)(s) is a proper subset of h*( Pj)(s). Let J(s) denote the set of 
states s’ E J such that s’ 2 s, and consider the Kripke structure (J(s), 2, h’, u*), 
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where 
h’( Pi) = (+ (Xi), for every predicate Pi in P, 
and 
h’(P) = h*(P), for every base predicate P in B. 
By (59), (J(s), s,h’,u*) satisfies 9, and thus, by Theorem 3.11, there exists a 
unique homomorphism r from (J(s), s,h’,u*) into (K*, s,h,,u,,). 
Recall that s = (B, U) for some Herbrand interpretation B for the base 
predicates in B over the universe U. Since r(( B, U)) E K* and r(( B, U)) 2 (B, U), 
it follows that T(( B, U)) r nK*(( B, U)). Thus: 
h’(q)((B,U)) Sh,,(q)( nK*((B,U))), 
by the definition of a homomorphism and the monotonicity of h,. However, 
h’(P)((B,U)) =c(Xj)(<B,U>) 
ch*(P)((B,U)) 
=h,(q)(FlK*((B,U))), byLemma4.3, 
which is a contradiction. We have thus shown that (J, I, h*,u*) satisfies the 
second conjunct in CircM’(P>; PI. 0 
Lemma 4.6. Let (J, 5, h, u) be any Kripke structure that satisfies the circumscription 
axiom Circ(S(P>; P). Then there exists a unique homomorphism from (J, I, h, u> 
into (C*, I, h*, u*) for every domain isomorphism L. 
PROOF. Since (J, I, h,u) satisfies S’(P), there exists a unique homomorphism 
T from (J, I, h,u) into (K*, I, h,,u,) for every domain isomorphism L, by 
Theorem 3.11. We will use this fact to construct a homomorphism r’ from 
(J, s,h,u) into (C*, s,h*,u*). First, for every s E J, define 
B(s) = {P(t, ,... ,t,> I(tl,... , t,) E h,(P)(r(s)),Pa base predicate in B}, 
U(s) =%(7(s))* 
Note that (B(s), U(s)) is an element of H. Since r(s) E K* and T(S) 2 (B(s), U(s)), 
it follows that T(S) 2 nK*(( B(s), U(s)>). We wish to show that T(S) = n K* 
((B(s), U(s))). 
Assume to the contrary that T(S)) > nK*((B(s’), U(s’>)> for some s’ E J. 
Define an assignment u= G/A.;: on (T(J), 5, h,,u,) by setting 
a(Xi)(~(s)) =h,(P,)(nK*((B(s),U(s)))), fori=l,...,k. 
Then, by the monotonicity of h,, 
CT(X~)(T(S)) Gh,(c)(T(s)), for i= l,...,k. 
Also, since S’(P) is satisfied on { nK*(( B(s), U(s1))l.s E Jl by Corollary 3.3, it 
follows from the definition of (T that 
c,r(s),T(J) -‘I(X) A i (Vx)[Xi(x) =‘p,(x)], 
i=l 
(61) 
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for every s E J. However, if T(s’) > nK*((B(s’), U(s’)>), then there exists 
a predicate Pj in P and a ground substitution 0 restricted to the constants in 
+,(r(s’)) such that 
(+,T(s’),~(J) ~Pj(X)e but a,7(sf),7(J) wXj(x)8. (62) 
Thus (r(J), s,hO,u,,) does not satisfy Circ(S’(P); P). But this means, by Lemma 
4.2, that (J, I, h, u) does not satisfy Circ(A%P); P) either. 
We have therefore shown that r(s) = n K*(( B(s), U(s))) for every s E J. Define 
T’(S) = (B(s), U(s)). It is obvious that conditions 1 and 2a of Definition 3.1 are 
satisfied. Condition 2b is obviously satisfied for the base predicates P in B, and for 
the defined predicates Pi in P we have 
h(Pi)(s) =‘ h,(Pi)(r(s)), (bythedefinitionof r) 
=h,(Pi)(nK*((B(s),U(s)))) 
=h*(P,)((B(s),iJ(s))) (byLemma4.3) 
=h*(P,)(r’(~)). 
Thus 7' is a homomorphism from (J, I, h, u) into (C*, I, h*, u*>. To see that T' is 
unique, it is sufficient to note that two distinct elements of C* have distinct values 
for either h* or u*, so that T,(s~) # TV implies si # s2 for all homomorphisms 71 
and TV from (J, <,h,u) into (C*, <,h*,u*). 0 
Theorem 4.7. Let 2 be a set of Horn clauses. Then (C*, I, h*,u*) is a final fipke 
model for Circ(S(P); P). 
Corollary 4.8. Let I+II be an arbitrary Horn clause. Then t,!~ is entailed by the circum- 
scription axiom Circ(S(P); P) if and only if tc, is true in (C*, I, h*,u*). 
Corollary 4.8 gives a precise characterization of what we have called the 
circumscriptive query problem. McCarty and van der Meyden [41] discuss two 
techniques for solving this problem. The first technique uses a special type of 
inductive proof, in which we first determine whether a prototypicalproof exists, and 
we then ask whether this prototypical proof is preserved under all transformations. 
For more details on prototypical proofs, see [39]. The second technique is an actual 
decision procedure. It turns out that the circumscriptive query problem is decidable 
if the consequent of I,!I is equivalent to a positive existential formula constructed 
out of base predicates only. For a detailed discussion of this decision procedure 
and its complexity, see [54]. It happens that the ‘ChristmasBlock’ example in 
Section 2.2 can be handled by both techniques, and the two solutions are presented 
in [41]. We have also applied the method of prototypical proofs to cases in which 
no decision procedure exists at all. One such case is the proof that naive reverse is 
a symmetric relation, discussed in Section 2.3. For a further discussion of this 
example, see [401. 
5. PRIORITIZED CIRCUMSCRIPTION 
We now wish to extend circumscription from the class of Horn clauses to the class 
of simple embedded implications. There is a problem with the ordinary circum- 
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scription axiom, however. Let us analyze the following (propositional) example: 
P+A (63) 
R+-k P] (64) 
Assume that we wish to circumscribe P and R in these rules. 
Our general approach, as in Section 4, is to construct a final Kripke model for 
the circumscribed rulebase. However, consider the Kripke model shown in Figure 
1. Observe that this structure satisfies Circ(S%?(P>; P). It is easy to see that the 
structure satisfies rules (63) and (641, but if we reduce the extension of P at s2 to 
null, or the extension of R at sg to null, then rule (64) is no longer satisfied. Thus 
the extensions of P and R in this model are as small as they can possibly be while 
still preserving the truth of S’(P). However, this result occurs for a very peculiar 
reason: P is not “forced” to be true at s2. Instead, if the extension of P at s2 were 
null, then B = P would be vacuously true at sr, which would force R to be true at 
sr (and also at s,>. It is peculiar that the one rule defining P, rule (631, plays no role 
in this analysis at all. 
What seems to be required in this example, intuitively, is first the circumscrip- 
tion of P in rule (63), and then the circumscription of R in rule (64). In other 
words, these rules are stratified, and they should be analyzed using prioritized 
circumscription. This is easy to do. First, we define stratification in the obvious way. 
A predicate in the stratum Pi can appear in an “atomic antecedent” in a rule 
defining a predicate in the stratum q if and only if i 5 j, and a predicate in the 
stratum Pi can appear in an “implicational antecedent” in a rule defining a 
predicate in the stratum q if and only if i <j. Thus, in rules (63) and (64), we 
could assign P to the stratum P, and R to the stratum P2 and obtain a proper 
stratification. Assume now that the defined predicates in 9’ 
into the strata P,, P2,. . . , P,,. 
have been partitioned 
Definition 5.1. The prioritized circumsctiption axiom is the 
second-order intuitionistic logic: 
~(P,,P*,...,P,) A 
n r 
following sentence in 
A (VX,...X,) 9(P ,,..., Pm_I,Xm ,... ,X,) A 
m=l I 
k(m) 
A (vx)[xm,i(x) *pm,i(x)l 
i=l 
k(m) 
* A (Vx)[Pm,i(x) ~xm,i<x>l ’ 
i=l I 
We denote this expression by Circ(S’(P); PI, P2,. . . , P,). 
FIGURE 1. A spurious Kripke model. 
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Our task now is to construct a final Kripke model for Circ(S’((P>; P,, P2,. . . , P,) 
when 9’ is a set of stratified rules in which the conclusions of all the implications 
on the right-hand side are base predicates. We first describe our construction, 
which is denoted by (D*, I, h*, u*). We then illustrate it using rules (63) and (64). 
Finally, we show in Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3 that (D*, I, h*,u*) has the desired 
properties. 
Our technique for constructing a final Kripke model uses a translation of the 
embedded implications into a set of Horn clauses in an extended language 9’. 
Recall that a simple embedded implication has the following form: 
P(x) =&r(x) A&(x) A *** A&k(X), (65) 
where P(x) is an atomic formula with free variables x, and where each g(x) is 
either an atomic formula Qi(x> or an embedded Horn clause Qi(X; y> e Aj Rij(X; y) 
with (zero or more) additional universal quantifiers. In the latter case, we replace 
the embedded Horn clause in (65) with a new atomic formula D(x), and we write 
the following definitional rules: 
Qi(X;Y) * A Rij(x;Y) AD(X)> (66) 
Q,(x;Y) * A ‘ij(X;Y) 
i 1 
(67) 
Observing that all rules 9 in the form (65) will be converted into Horn clauses by 
this device, we denote this set of Horn clauses byX We also denote the set of new 
definitional predicates by D, and we add them to the base predicates already in B. 
Y is the language with the predicates in D added to 9. 
We now construct a Kripke model in three stages: 
Let (C*, I, h*, u*) be the final Kripke model for Circ@fP); P) in the 
extended language 9’. In this construction, we take B U D to be the set of 
base predicates. 
Let Ts be the transformation associated with the rules (66) and (67) by 
Definition 3.8. Define D* = U{J 1 J c T,(J) 17 C*}. By Lemma 3.12, D* is the 
largest subset of C* such that (D*, I, h*,u*) satisfies the definitional rules 
for the new predicates in D. 
Delete the predicates in D from the definition of h*, thus producing a Kripke 
structure for the language 9. 
The third stage is optional. We may consider (D*, I, h*,u*) to be a Kripke 
structure for the language _Y or the language _Y, as we wish. 
We illustrate these definitions using rules (63) and (64). First, as a point of 
reference, we compute the final Kripke model (K*, 5, h,,u,) for the original rules 
9%‘. The result is shown in Figure 2. We now replace the implication on the 
right-hand side of rule (64) with a new defined predicate, D, and we add two 
definitional rules: B = P A D and D =[B e PI. Next, we compute the Kripke 
structure (C*, 5, h*,u*), taking A, B, and D as the base predicates, and P and R 
as the defined predicates. (For clarity, we write the base predicates in each state on 
the left and the defined predicates on the right, separated by a colon.) We thus 
obtain the result shown in Figure 3. To compute D*, we now delete all states that 
do not satisfy the definitional rules, a procedure that converges to a fixed point 
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sg (ABPR) 
ST {iPR) sg {iPR) 
/\/\ 
34 {API ~5 (PR} se {BR) FIGURE 2. (K*, 5, h,, uo>. 
v\/ 
32 {PI ~3 {RI 
after a single step. The state s7 is deleted because of the rule B -P A D, and the 
states si,, and sii are deleted because of the rule D c=[B -PI. Finally, we delete 
the defined predicates D from the representation of h* in each state. The final 
result is shown in Figure 4. (Note that we have numbered the states in Figures 3 
and 4 to correspond to the states in Figure 2.) 
What have we constructed in Figure 4? First, (D*, 5, h*,u*) cannot be a final 
Kripke model for the ordinary circumscription axiom Circ(9(P); P), since there 
is no homomorphism from the model in Figure 1 into the model in Figure 4. On 
the other hand, (D*, 5, h*,u*) satisfies Circ(A?(P>; P) itself, as we will see in 
Theorem 6.2 in Section 6. This means that there can be no final Kripke model at 
all for Circ(S(P); P> applied to rules (63) and (64). For if such a model existed, we 
could embed each of the models in Figures 1 and 4 into it, and we could, in turn, 
embed it into the model in Figure 2. The reader can verify that such a model could 
not possibly satisfy Circ(9(P); I’). If we assume that (D*, <,h*,u*) is a final 
Kripke model for Circ(90’); P,, P2,. . . , PJ, however, we obtain a reasonable set 
of inferences. Observe that A * P, B c= P A R, and B = A A R are true in the model 
in Figure 4, but none of these implications is true in the model in Figure 2. 
Intuitively, this seems to be the correct result for the prioritized circumscription of 
rules (63) and (64). We now verify these intuitions. 
Lemma 5.2. (D*, 5, h*,u*) satisfies the prioritized circumscription axiom Circ 
(90-9; P1,P2,.. .,PJ. 
PROOF. It is obvious that (D*, I, h*, u*> satisfies 9(P,, P2,. . . , PJ. We thus need 
to show that the remaining conjuncts in Definition 5.1 are satisfied as well. 
sll {iB:P} s, {AD:PR} se $D:R) 
$4 { AwW FIGURE 3. (C*, 5, h*,u*). 
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sg {ABPR} 
/ 
\ 
.G {BR} 
84 (AP) 
\\_lijx’ 
FIGURE 4. (D*, s,h*,u*) 
Assume the contrary. Let m be the first stratum at which one of the second-order 
terms inside the conjunction in Definition 5.1 is not true. Then there exists some 
assignment g = uRX_;::$m$$;;l....,~ ;(., xn k(n) and some state s E D* such that 
a,s,D*kS(P, ,..., P,,_l,Xm ,..., A-,) A 
k(m) 
but 
A (vx)[xm,i(x> *pm,i(x)l~ 
(68) 
i=l 
k(m) 
~7 s,D* # Al (VX)[ f’m,i(X> *Xm,i(X>I * 
Define a new assignment (T’ by setting 
(69) 
u’(Xj,i) =h*(q,i), for every predicate Pi, i in P, , . . . , P,,, _ 1, 
u’(xm,i) = a(xm,i)~ for every predicate variable X,, i in X, , 
a’(xj,i) =h*(c,i), for every predicate Pj, i in P,,, + 1,. . . , P, . 
We will show that (+ ‘, s,D* KS?‘(X), and that this leads to a contradiction. 
We first consider the Horn clauses in 2$(P), i.e., those clauses defining 
predicates in P,,,. Let P&x) = a$ P>(x) A Al D,(x) be such a clause, and assume 
that 
(+‘,s’,D* ~‘(X)(X)OA /j D,(x)0 (70) 
1 
for some S’ 2 s and some ground substitution 0 restricted to the constants in 
u*(s’). Here, d(P)(x) is a conjunction of atomic formulae with free variables x that 
depends on the predicates in P, and each D,(x) is an atomic formula that has been 
defined to be equivalent to an embedded Horn clause in 99 by the rules in 
(66)-(67). Assume that these rules have the following general form: 
D,(x) - (VY)[Q,(X;Y> * ~~P)(x;Y)]~ (71) 
where gJp)(x; y) is a conjunction of atomic formulae with free variables x and y 
that depends on the predicates in P, and where Q1 is a base predicate in B. 
However, because of the stratification of 9 and 2% .S$Pxx; y) actually depends 
only on the predicates in P,, . . . , P,,, _ 1. Thus, from (70) and (71) we have 
u’,s’,D* kd(X)(x)OA /j (‘Jy)[Q,(x;y)B~~~(X)(x;Y)~], (72) 
1 
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but this is just the right-hand side of a rule in SZ,#‘). Thus, 
(T,s’,D* !=a’(P, ,..., P,,_,,X,)OA 
/\ (vy)[Q,(x;~>e = ~~(P,,...,P,-,)(~;Y)~I, (73) 
from which u, s’,D* bXm,j(x)O follows by (68). We have therefore shown that 
u’, s’,D* bX,,,i(x)O and thus, 
u’,s,D* I= (vx) Xm,i(x)=d(X)(x) A A D,(x) 7 [ I 1 (74) 
since u and CT ’ agree on all predicate variables in X,. 
We now show the same result for the remaining strata of G-Z For strata below 
Zm, this is obvious. For strata Z$+ 1,. . . , q, this follows from the fact that 
(T’(X,,~)(S’) c h*(P,,iXs’) for all s’ r s and for i = 1,. . . ,I&). Putting these 
pieces together, we have shown that 
but 
k(m) 
~‘3 s,D* # A (VX) [ ‘m,,(X) *Xm,i(X>] * 
i=l 
But this contradicts the fact, shown by Lemma 
Circ(z!UJ); PI. 0 
(76) 
4.5, that (D*, <,h*,u*) satisfies 
Lemma 5.3. Let (J, 5, h,u) be any fipke structure that satisjies the prioritized 
circumscription axiom Circ(9ZX PI; P,, P2, . . . , P,,). Then there exists a homomor- 
phism (not necessaril’y unique) j?om (J, I, h, u> into (D*, I, h*, u*>. 
PROOF. The basic idea of the proof is to construct a homomorphism inductively, 
stratum by stratum, using successive applications of Lemma 4.6. For technical 
reasons, we begin the induction at stratum n and proceed downwards to stratum 1. 
We first extend the mapping h in (J, 5, h, u> to the atomic predicates in D, so 
that the definitions in (66)-(67) are satisfied. For example, if the n-ary predicate D 
is defined by the rule 
D(x) a (vy)[Q(x;y) = B(P)(x;y)I > 
then, for every t,, . . . , t, in t(u(s)>, we stipulate that 
(t I,...rtn) E h(D)(s) iff 
~,J~(~y)[Q(<t,,...,t,);y)~~(P)((t,,...,t,);y)]. 
With this extension of h, it is easy to see that (J, 5, h, u) satisfies the Horn clauses 
in 2 
For the base case of the induction, we work with the last conjunct in Definition 
5.1, the conjunct in which the only quantified second-order variables are in X,, and 
the predicates in P,, . . . , P,, _ 1 are all constants. Assume that (J, I, h, u) does not 
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satisfy Circ(2$P1, . . . , P, _ I) P,>; P,>. Then there must exist an assignment (+ = 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ on (J, I, h, u) and a state s E J such that n.1 n&(n) 
(+,s,J~~(Pl,...,P,-1,Xn) A 
k(n) 
A W) P&i(X) -pn,i(x)l 
i=l 
but 
(77) 
k(n) 
However, since the definitions in (66)-(67) associated with the rules in S’,, depend 
only on the predicates in P,, . . . , P,, _ I, it follows from (77) that 
~,s,J~~~(P~,...,P,-I,~,). (79) 
This contradicts the last conjunct in Definition 5.1. 
We have thus shown that (J, I, h, II) satisfies the circumscription axiom Circ 
@$P,,..., Pn_l,Pn);Pn). We now apply Lemma 4.6. Let (C,, s,h,,u,) be the 
final Kripke model for Circ(&“,(P,, . . . , P,_ 1, P,); P,), and let 7, be the unique 
homomorphism from (J, 4, h,u) into (C,, I, h,,un). Note that all the predicates 
in P1,...,Pn_l are treated as base predicates in this construction, and that the 
extension of the predicates in P,, is given by the least tixed point of g that 
includes these base predicates. This establishes the base step of our induction. 
For the inductive step, assume for 1 < m + 1 5 n that there exists a unique 
homomorphism r, + 1 from (J, s,h,u) into (Cm+l, s,hm+l,u,+l), which is the 
final Kripke model for Circ(Zm + r( P2, . . . , P,,, , P,,, + 1 1; P,,, + 1 1. Assume that the predi- 
cates in PI,..., P, are treated as base predicates in this construction, and that the 
extension of the predicates in P,,,+ 1,. . . , P,, is given by the least tixed-point of 
z u*** m+l ~8 that includes these base predicates. We will show that the same 
property holds for stratum m. 
We first show that (J, I, h, u) satisfies Circ@$P,, . . . , P,,, _ Ir P,); P,). Assume 
the contrary. Then there must exist an assignment cr = uR2;!;;b:;$) on (J, 5, h, u> 
and a state s E J such that 
but 
A (“I[ xm,i(x> * pm,i(x)l 
i=l 
k(m) 
(80) 
g,s,J# A (Vx)[Pm,i(X) aXm,i<X>]* (81) 
i=l 
However, since the definitions in (66)-(67) associated with the rules in LTm depend 
only on the predicates in PI,. . . , P, _ 1, it follows from (80) that 
~,s,J~~~(P~,...,P,-I,~,). (82) 
The argument so far is identical to the argument in the base case. However, we 
now need to extend u from an assignment on the predicate variables in X,,, to an 
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assignment on the predicate variables in X,, X, + 1,. . . , X,, and we need to extend 
(82) from the rules in 9,,, to the rules in L%&, 9,,, + 1, . . . , Sn. 
Consider the rules in 9m + i(Pr, . . . , P,,, _ 1, X,, X, + 1). The implications embed- 
ded in these rules depend only on the predicates in PI,. . . , P,,, _ 1, plus the predicate 
variables in X,. So if we fix (T = uR?$;;i2$;), we can treat B’,,, + 1 as a set of Horn 
clauses with an additional set of base predicates that are equivalent, at each s E J, 
to the extensions of these implications under the assignment (+. Compute the least 
fixed point of this set of Horn clauses at each s E J, and set cr(X,+ &) equal to 
the extension of X,, 1 i in this least fixed point. Then (+, s, J L%‘~+ ,(P,, . . . , 
Pm _ 1, X,, X, + 1 ). Note that the extension of 
(VY>[Q(~;Y)~~(P,,...,P,-,,X,)(~;Y)] 
under the assignment u might be greater than the extension of 
(VY)[Q(~;Y)~~(P,,...,P,-,,P,)(~;Y)], 
and thus the extension of X m+ l,i 
However, cr(X,+ ,,iXS,) c 
might be greater than the extension of Pm + I, i. 
~(xm+l,i Xs,> whenever s1 IS~, and thus (+ is a well- 
defined mapping from the predicate variables in _Y to the intuitionistic relations 
on J. Continuing this construction inductively, from stratum m + 1 upwards, we 
eventually arrive at an assignment u = ~~2;: ::;~L;$~;:$;;~(~~) such that 
’ u,s,JL%‘(P1 ,..., Pm-I,Xm ,..., X,) A 
k(m) 
but 
A (vx)[xm,i(x) j pm,i(x)l 
(83) 
i=l 
k(m) 
u,s,J' A (Vx>[Pm,i<X> *Xm,i(X>I* 
i=l 
(84) 
This contradicts our hypothesis that (J, I, h, u) satisfies Definition 5.1. 
We have thus shown that (J, 5, h,u) satisfies the circumscription axiom Circ 
GqP1,...,Pm-l, Pm); Pm>. Applying Lemma 4.2 and using the homomorphism 
r,+ 1 given by the induction hypothesis, (C,, 1, 5, h,, 1,u,+ 1> also satisfies 
Circ(&(P,,..., Pm-*, Pm>; Pm). Thus, by Lemma 4.6, there exists a unique homo- 
morphism r from (Cm+l, s,hm+l,um+l) into (C,, s,hm,um), the final Kripke 
model for Circ<&“,< P,, . . . , P,,, _ 1, Pm); Pm>. In this construction, the predicates in 
P Pr?-1 1,“‘, are treated as base predicates, and it is easy to see that the extension 
of the predicates in Pm, P,,, + 1,. . . , P, is given by the least fixed point of Zm U 
A? u**- m+l u+%$ that includes these base predicates. We now compose rm + 1 and r 
to obtain a homomorphism TV, and the inductive proof is complete. 
Now consider the homomorphism r1 from (J, s,h,u) into (C,, I,hl,ul). The 
only base predicates in this construction are those in B and those added by 
the definitional rules in (66)-(67). Thus r1 is actually a homomorphism into 
(C*, I, h*, u*>. We need to show, finally, that 71 is a mapping into D* and not just 
a mapping into C*. This is easy. Since (J, I, h, u) satisfies the definitions in 
(66)-(671, (TV, I, h*,u*) satisfies these definitions, too, by Lemma 3.4. Thus 
~~(5) L Ta(~l(J)) by Lemma 3.10, and ~~(5) c D* by the definition of D*. 0 
The reader might wonder why Lemma 5.3 does not assert that the homo- 
morphism r1 is unique. The answer is: It depends on the language. In 9, 71 is a 
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unique homomorphism and (D*, I, h*,u*) is a final Kripke model for Circ 
(SF(P); P,, P2,. . . , PJ, but in the original language, _Y, this may not be the case. 
We will discuss this point further in Section 6. In the meantime, we note that this 
distinction has no bearing on the question of genericity. The following theorem 
holds without regard to the choice of language. 
Theorem 5.4. Let $ be an arbitrary Horn clause. Then Cc, is entailed by the priori- 
tized circumsctiption axiom Circ(9( P>; P,, P2,. . . , P,,) if and only if 1c, is true in 
(D*, I, h*, u*). 
6. PARTIAL CIRCUMSCRIPTION 
There is another analysis of the spurious Kripke model in Figure 1, an analysis that 
does not depend on the notion of stratification. According to this analysis, the 
problem with state s2 is due to the syntactic position of the predicate P within rule 
(64). Reducing the extension of P at s2 leads to an increase in the extension of 
B = P at sr, and this forces R to be true at both sr and s2. This can always happen 
when P is part of the antecedent of an implication on the right-hand side of a rule, 
but it can never happen when P is an atomic formula on the right-hand side of a 
rule, and it can never happen when P is a predicate on the left-hand side of a rule, 
as in (63). This analysis suggests removing P from the scope of the minimization 
in (64). 
We call this approach partial circumscription. Formally, let us define S’(PlP’) to 
be the result of replacing every occurrence of a predicate Pi in the antecedent of 
an implication embedded in 9 by a new predicate P,! in P’. We can then write 
&YIP’) to denote the replacement of the remaining occurrences of predicate 
constants in P with predicate variables in X. 
Definition 6.1. The partial circumscription axiom is the following sentence in sec- 
ond-order intuitionistic logic: 
Circ( 9( PIP’); P) A i\ (Vx) [ P,(x) e P;(x)] 
i=l 
In other words, we are using the ordinary circumscription axiom in the first 
conjunct to vary the extension of P in S@PlP’) without varying the extension 
of P’, and we are then asserting in the second conjunct that P and P’ are 
equivalent. We denote the full sentence by PZC(S(P); P>. 
Partial circumscription in intuitionistic logic is a very natural idea, especially in 
those cases in which the circumscribed embedded implications are interpreted as 
definitions. The positive occurrence of a predicate within the scope of the circum- 
scription axiom is always a dejiniendum, while the positive occurrences outside the 
scope of the circumscription axiom are always part of the definiens. The purpose of 
the circumscription axiom is to minimize the extension of the definiendum, making 
it exactly equal to the extension of the definiens. But when a predicate occurs in 
the antecedent of an implication on the right-hand side of a rule, we are asserting 
the predicate, hypothetically, rather than defining it. We want the extension of this 
asserted predicate to be the same as the extension of the definiendum, what- 
ever that extension turns out to be under the operation of the circumscription 
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axiom. This is precisely the condition asserted by the sentence PZC(3’(P); P) in 
Definition 6.1. 
We now show that (D*, 5, h*, u*), the Kripke model constructed in Section 5, is 
also a final Kripke model for PZC(z%‘(P); P). A slight modification is necessary, 
since we have additional predicates P’ in our language, but all we need to do is set 
h*(PiHs) = h*(PiXs) for all s ED* and all P: in P’. As usual, we need to prove 
two lemmas. We actually prove a stronger result in place of the first lemma, since 
(D*, 5, h*, u*> satisfies the ordinary circumscription axiom C&(9(P); PI as well. 
The proof that (D*, S, h*,u*) satisfies PZC(G?(P); P) is given as a corollary. 
Theorem 6.2. (D*, c,h*,u*) satisfies Circ(S(P); P). 
PROOF. It is obvious that (D*, <,h*,u*) satisfies 9(P). We thus need to show 
that the second conjunct in Definition 4.1 is satisfied as well. Assume the contrary. 
Then there exists some assignment u = aRThtf::k? and some state s E D* such 
that 
u,s,D* kZ(X) A i\ (Vx)[X,(x) -P;(x)] 
i=l 
(85) 
but 
c~,s,D* # A (Vx)[P;(x) -X,(x)]. 
i=l 
(86) 
We will show that u, s, D* k=2$X), and that this leads to a contradiction. 
To this end, let P(x)*&‘(PXx) A A, D,(x) be a Horn clause in EfP), and 
assume that 
c~,s’,D* W(X)(x)OA A D,(x)8 (87) 
for some s’ 2 s and some ground substitution 0 restricted to the constants in 
u*(s’). We use the same notation here as in the proof of Lemma 5.2, and we 
assume that the definitional rules in (66)-(67) have the following general form: 
D{(X) e (VY)[e,(x;Y) * B!(P)(x;Y)l. (W 
We need to show that v,s’,D* kX(x)O. By construction, (D*, I, h*,u*) satisfies 
the rules in (88), and thus 
~,s’,D*~(Vy)[Q,(x;~)e(=~~(P)(x;y)eAD,(x)B]. (89) 
But by (85), (T(X~XS”) c h*(P,Xs”) for every predicate P, in P and for every state 
s” 2s’ in D*, and thus 
u,s’,D* !=(t/y)[Q,(x;~)f+~/(X)(x;y)~AD,(x)f$ 
From (87) and (90) we conclude 
(90) 
(+,s’,D*bd(X)(x)eA A (VY)[Q,(x;Y)e.+~@)(x;y)q. 
I 
(91) 
But P(x)= I;4(PXx) A AI (Vy)[Q,<x; y>= g,(PXx; y)l is a rule in 9, and so it 
follows from (85) and (91) that U, s’,D* bX(x)O. 
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We have thus shown that V, S, D* k%fX). Together with (861, this implies that 
(D*, 5, h*, u*> does not satisfy G-c@?(P); P), which contradicts Lemma 4.5. 0 
Corollary 6.3. (D*, 2, h*, u*> satisfies PZC(S’(P); P). 
PROOF. The proof is the same, but simpler. For the partial circumscription axiom, 
(85) would be replaced by 
u,s,D* t=S.‘(XIP’) A i (b’x)[Xi(x) *pi(x)], 
i=l 
(92) 
and (89) would be equivalent to 
(T,s’,D*~(VY)[Q,<~;Y)~~=~(P’)(~;Y)~A~,(~)~]. 
We could then replace (91) by 
(93) 
a,s’,D* kti(x>(x>OA A (V~)[Q,(x;~)e~~~(P’)(x;y)e], (94) 
and from (92) and (94) we would infer U, s’, D* k X(x)0, as in the prior proof. 0 
Lemma 6.4. Let (J, I, h, u) be any apke structure that satisfies the partial circum- 
scription axiom PZC(S’(P); PI. Then there exists a homomorphism (not necessatily 
unique) from (J, ~,h,u) into (D*, <,h*,u*). 
PROOF. The proof is basically a simplified version of the proof of Lemma 5.3. We 
first extend the mapping h in (J, I, h, u) to the atomic predicates in D, so that 
the definitions in (66)-(67) are satisfied. In this construction, we also replace the 
predicates in P by the corresponding predicates in P’. For example, if the 
n-ary predicate D is defined by the rule 
D(x) = Py)[Q(x;y) = ~U’)(x;~)1v 
then, for every t,, . . ., t, in t(u(s)), we stipulate that 
(t I,...,tn) Eh(D)(s) iff 
s,Jb W)[Q(O l,...,tn);Y)~~(P’)((tl,...,t,);Y)]. 
With this extension of h, it is easy to see that (J, I, h, u> satisfies the Horn clauses 
in Z 
Assume that (J, I, h, II) does not satisfy Circ@$P); PI. Then there exists an 
assignment (+ and a state s E J such that 
a,s,Jk@X) A i\ (Vx>[X,(x> =Pi(x)] 
i=l 
(95) 
but 
u,s,J# ,hl (VX)[f’i(X) *xi(x)]. (96) 
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However, since h(D)(s) depends on the extensions of the predicates in P’ rather 
than the predicates in P, it follows from (95) that 
(T,s,JMY(XIP’), (97) 
and this contradicts the fact that (J, I, h,u) satisfies the partial circumscription 
axiom PZC(S?(P); P). 
We have thus shown that (J, 5, h,u) satisfies Circ(k%P); PI. By Lemma 4.6, 
there exists a homomorphism T into (C*, 5, h*,u*). We need to show that T is a 
mapping into D* and not just a mapping into C*. This is easy. Since (J, I, h, u) 
satisfies the definitions in (66)-(67), (7(J), 4, h*, u*> satisfies these definitions, too, 
by Lemma 3.4. Thus ~(5) cTg(dJ)) by Lemma 3.10, and ~(5) CD* by the 
definition of D*. 17 
Theorem 6.5. Let $ be an arbitrary Horn clause. Then Cc, is entailed by the partial 
circumscription axiom PZC(AS?(P); P) if and only if + is true in (D*, I, h*, u*>. 
As we pointed out in Section 5, the status of CD*, 5, h*,u*) as a final Kripke 
model depends on whether we view it as a structure for the language 2 or the 
language 2’. 
In an early version of this paper [38], we proposed a slightly different operation 
in the third stage of our construction. Instead of deleting the predicates in D from 
the definition of h*, we projected D* into (K*, 2, h,,u,) using a unique homo- 
morphism r. This operation guarantees that the end result is a final Kripke model 
for the language ._Y as well as for the language 2’. (The example in Figure 4 
comes out the same under either operation.) Unfortunately, (m(D*), 5, h,,u,) 
does not always satisfy the partial circumscription axiom. Here is a counter- 
example: 
P(a) = [ I =P(b)] A [I c=P(c)] (98) 
P(b) .+ [ I *P(c)] A [I =P(a)] (99) 
P(c) = [ I -P(a)] A [I =P(b)] ( 100) 
G=[I =P(x)] ( 101) 
Figure 5 depicts the final Kripke model for these rules in the language _Y’, in 
which we have used the obvious definition: notP(x) = [I =P(x)]. By Corollary 
6.3, this structure satisfies PZC(S(P); P). However, the projection of this structure 
into (K*, I, h,,u,) would map states s2, ss, and sq into a single state s’ which 
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would be dominated by sg, se, and s7 in the partial order, and the extension of G 
at s’ could then be reduced to null without violating rules (98)-(101X Thus 
(r(D*), I, h,,u,) does not satisfy PZC(%‘(P); P>. 
7. DISCUSSION 
This paper has extended the theory of circumscription from the class of intuitionis- 
tic Horn clauses [41, 391 to the class of intuitionistic embedded implications with 
base conclusions. Two approaches were analyzed: First, for the case of stratified 
embedded implications, we defined the prioritized circumscription axiom Circ 
W(P); P,, P*, . . ., P,). Second, we defined the partial circumscription axiom 
PZC(S%‘(P); PI. The main result of the paper is that these two forms of circumscrip- 
tion coincide in the case of stratified rules. Specifically, we showed in Theorems 5.4 
and 6.5 that the prioritized circumscription axiom and the partial circumscription 
axiom entail exactly the same set of implicational goals in those cases in which both 
axioms are properly defined. This is an important result, since the partial circum- 
scription axiom makes no reference at all to the stratification, and it is properly 
defined even for unstratified embedded implications. 
There are analogous results in classical logic, at least for the special case of 
embedded negations. The relationship between prioritized circumscription and 
stratified negation-as-failure was originally discussed in [30] and [481. As in Section 
5 of the present paper, the results of Lifschitz and Przymusinski require the 
stratification of the program to be explicitly encoded in the circumscription axiom. 
The first circumscriptive formulation of negation-as-failure that does not depend 
on an explicit encoding of the stratification appears in the work of Phan Minh 
Dung, in two versions: [14] and [13]. Dung [13] proposes that a certain second-order 
sentence be identified as the strong completion of a program, and he shows that this 
sentence precisely characterizes the stable model semantics of Gelfond and Lifschitz 
[20]. More closely related to our work, however, is a result of Fangzhen Lin in his 
dissertation [31]. Lin defines a form of partial circumscription in classical ogic that 
is virtually identical to our Definition 6.1 when the embedded implications in &I! 
are restricted to embedded negations. He then shows that this circumscriptive 
formula precisely characterizes the stable models of 9. 
It is interesting to compare these results in classical logic with our results in 
intuitionistic logic. The first point to note is that partial intuitionistic circumscrip- 
tion applied to a set of embedded negations is not equivalent to the stable model 
semantics, although the two are closely related. We summarize here several results 
on this relationship, drawn from [43]. First, the final Kripke model for the partial 
intuitionistic circumscription of 2 contains noncontradictory states (i.e., states 
without I> if and only if the corresponding logic program has at least one stable 
model. For these “noncontradictory” programs, the final Kripke model has the 
following properties: 
1. It has a set of maximal noncontradictory states. These states correspond to 
the stable models of the program. 
2. It has a unique minimal state. This state can be computed from the intersec- 
tion of the negutiue literuls in the stable models of the program. Specifically, 
let S,(Z) be the stability transformation defined by Van Gelder [56], and 
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recall that S, operates on the negative literals in the interpretation Z. Then, 
for any ground atom P: 
(a) PZC(9(P); P) I= 7 P iff P is false in all stable models of 9. 
(b) PZC(9(P); P) k P iff P E S,(( 7 QIQ is false in all stable models of 9)). 
Notice, in particular, that the least state of the final Kripke model is not 
(in general) a stable model of the program, nor is it (in general) the ordinary 
intersection of the stable models of the program. 
Here is an example to illustrate this relationship. Imagine a game, whose precise 
rules are not known, but for which we know the following (for a particular player 
‘a’): 
Win(a) = N Lose(a) ( 102) 
Lose(a) c= N Win(a) ( 103) 
Furthermore, since this is all we know about winning and losing, we will circum- 
scribe the occurrences of ‘Win’ and ‘Lose’ on the left-hand sides of these rules. 
Assume we also know that ‘a’ stops playing if he wins, and that ‘a’ stops playing if 
he loses: 
Stop(a) = Lose(a) ( 104) 
Stop(a) * Win(a) ( 105) 
Finally, we say that the game is “sound” if it is not possible for ‘a’ both to win and 
lose, that is: 
Sound = [ I = Win( a) A Lose(a)] ( 106) 
(In the first-order version of this example, this latter rule would be written with an 
embedded universal quantifier.) Intuitively, we would like to conclude that the 
game is “sound.” Should we also conclude that ‘a’ stops playing? 
The final Kripke model for the partial intuitionistic circumscription of rules 
(102)-(106) is shown in Figure 6. To see the relationship to the stable model 
semantics, it is helpful to split the definition of ‘Sound’ into two parts: 
Unsound = Win(a) A Lose(a) 
Sound c= N Unsound 
Then s2 and s3 are the stable models of the program, and ‘Unsound’ is false in 
both. Since ‘ ~UnSound’ is in the intersection of the negative parts of the stable 
models of W, ‘Sound’ is true in sl, the least state of the final Kripke model. Note 
that s1 is not itself a stable model. What conclusions do we draw from this final 
Kripke model? We can conclude that the game is “sound,” as expected, but we 
84 (1) 
A\ 
s2 {Win(a), Stop(a), Sound} 33 {Lose(a), Stop(a), Sound} 
FIGURE 6. The ‘Win/Lose’ example. 
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cannot conclude that ‘a’ stops playing. At most, we can conclude that if ‘a’ stops 
playing then either ‘a’ wins or ‘a’ loses. We let the reader decide if these answers 
are intuitively correct. 
The ‘Win/Lose’ example-an unstratified program-shows that partial circum- 
scription in intuitionistic logic is not the same as partial circumscription in classical 
logic [31]. For a stratified program, of course, there is only one stable model 1201, 
and this means that the final Kripke model for partial intuitionistic circumscription 
collapses (in the propositional case) to a single state. Thus, for stratified programs, 
partial circumscription in intuitionistic logic and partial circumscription in classical 
logic coincide. However, Definition 6.1 is not restricted to embedded negations. It 
is defined for arbitrary embedded implications with arbitrary base predicates, and 
the application to (stratified or unstratified) negation-as-failure is just a special 
case. 
As an illustration of the more general case, let us return to the ‘GreenTower’ 
example presented in Section 2.2. Consider the partial intuitionistic circumscription 
of ‘Above’ and ‘GreenTower’ in rules (36)-(38), taking ‘On’ and ‘Green’ as base 
predicates. A small fragment of the final Kripke model is shown in Figure 7. We 
are interested in query (39), which is repeated here for convenience: 
(Vx, y ) [ GreenTower( x) = Above( x, y ) A GreenTower( y >] . 
The antecedent of this implication is true in sj for x = c2 and y = ci, and we note 
that GT(c,) is also true in sj. Similarly, the antecedent of this implication is true in 
s5 for x = c3 and y = ci, and also for x = cg and y = c2, and we note that GT(c,) is 
true in ss as well. On the other hand, the antecedent is not true in si, s2, and sq. 
Thus query (39) is “forced” in all the states depicted in Figure 7. It is easy to see 
that this will always be the case, and that (39) is therefore true in the final Kripke 
model for the partial circumscription axiom. We have a different result for query 
(40), which is also repeated here for convenience: 
(Vx, y ) [ GreenTower( y ) c= Green(y) A On( x, y) A GreenTower( x)] . 
aa {$c~),G(ca), G(Q , GTtc~),GTtca), GT(ca)l 
{WCs, 4, Ab(ca, 4, WCs, 41 
V 
33 {G(Q), G(cz), GT(cl), C=.(Q)} 34 ((44, G(e), GT(ca)l 
{Ontcz, 4, Ab(cz, cl)} {Ab(ca, 4, Ab(c4,cd) 
~1 {G(Q), GT(c,)) 
I 
.e (G(G), G(Q), GT(ca)) 
(On(cz> 4 Ab(ca, CI)) 
I 
FIGURE 7. The ‘GreenTower’ example. 
CIRCUMSCRIBING EMBEDDED IMPLICATIONS 359 
In this case, state sz in Figure 7 provides a countermodel. The antecedent of query 
(40) is true in s2 for x = c2 and y = cl, but GT(c,) is not true in s2. Although the 
implication on the right-hand side of the definition of ‘GreenTower( 
is forced at states sg and higher, it is not forced at sq, since cq is not green. We 
have thus shown that query (40) is not entailed by the partial circumscription 
axiom. Since rules (36)-(38) are stratified, exactly the same results hold for the 
prioritized circumscription axiom. 
Beyond these examples, there are numerous other potential applications of 
partial and prioritized circumscription in intuitionistic logic. In general, potential 
applications will arise whenever there are reasons to use intuitionistic embedded 
implications-in logic programming 146, 441, in deductive data bases [6, 8, 101, in 
natural language processing [471, or in commonsense reasoning 17, 371-and 
whenever it is appropriate to constrain the defined predicates in the embedded 
implications by some form of the “closed world” assumption. In such cases, an 
intuitionistic interpretation of the circumscription axiom seems essential, since it is 
the intuitionistic interpretation of embedded implications that produces useful 
results. For example: 
l In [91, intuitionistic embedded implications are combined with stratified 
negation-as-failure to yield a logic programming language with substantial 
expressive power. The programs for ‘Even’ and ‘Hamiltonian Path’ in this 
paper illustrate the potential significance of intuitionistic logic programming 
for practical applications. But what is the proper semantics for this language? 
Bonner and McCarty 191 constructed a “preferred model” of the set of 
stratified embedded implications, extending the idea of Przymusinski’s 
“perfect model” semantics [481 to a special kind of Kripke model. But the 
construction was complex and too closely tied to the proof theory it was 
trying to emulate. A better approach, it now appears, would be to use partial 
intuitionistic circumscription. 
l A series of papers by Hall&s and Schroeder-Heister [23, 24, 501 proposes a 
proof-theoretic approach to logic programming, in which program clauses are 
treated as special inference rules. One novel feature of their proposal is a 
principle of “definitional reflection” which allows the expansion of a defined 
atom on the left-hand side of a sequent. For Horn clauses, this princi- 
ple causes no serious problems (except for the fact that the proof 
theory is infinitary!), but for embedded implications, which can also appear 
as program clauses in Hall&s and Schroeder-Heister’s ystem, there are 
questions about the proper interpretation of “definitional reflection.” 
Although Hall&s and Schroeder-Heister eschew traditional semantic 
approaches, it appears that partial intuitionistic circumscription provides the 
correct semantic counterpart to their exclusively proof-theoretic operations. 
There are additional details to be worked out in each of these examples, of course, 
and this will be the subject of future research. 
Another subject of future research is a topic deliberately omitted from the 
present paper: What about the class of intuitionistic embedded implications with 
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defined conclusions? Under one interpretation, our theory applies to this class of 
sentences without modification. Take the following rule as an illustration: 
P(x) = [QG> -(x)1 ( 107) 
Suppose we interpret the definition of stratification in Section 5 to require that the 
stratum defining the predicate Q is strictly less than the stratum defining the 
predicate P, and we interpret the definition of Circ(~@P); P,, P2,. . . , PJ accord- 
ingly. Under this interpretation, the reader can check that Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3 still 
go through. Suppose we treat the occurrence of Q in rule (107) as one of the 
occurrences that is replaced by a predicate Q’ in Section 6, and we interpret 
the definition of PZC(&%‘(P); P) accordingly. Again, under this interpretation, the 
reader can check that Corollary 6.3 and Lemma 6.4 still go through. Thus 
(D*, I, h*,u*) is a final Kripke model for both Ci&%XP>; P,, P2,. . . , PJ and 
PZC(S?(P); P), even if 9? includes implications with defined conclusions, under the 
suggested interpretation. 
The question, though, is whether this interpretation is correct. Let us return to 
the ‘NearGraduate’ example discussed in Section 1. Suppose we are told that ‘ron’ 
is a near graduate of the ‘physics’ department, according to the definitions in rules 
(1) and (4)~(5). Intuitively, we ought to be able to conclude from this information 
that ‘ron’ has taken at least one physics course, although we would not know which 
one. Here is a simplified version of the same example: 
G=T(a) A T(b) ( 108) 
NG= [G=T(x)] ( 109) 
By the same reasoning, we ought to be able to conclude from these rules that NG 
implies (3x)T(x). However, Figure 8 depicts the structure CD*, I, h*,u*) for 
this example in the language 9, in which we have used the definition D(x) = 
[G=T(x)]. It is apparent that NG does not imply Elx)T(x) in this model. Thus 
neither prioritized circumscription nor partial circumscription gives us the result 
that we expected. 
The analysis of this example in classical ogic is even worse. In the final Kripke 
model depicted in Figure 8, the following query is true: 
[G*T(a)] V [G=T(b)] eNG (110) 
FIGURE 8. Simplified ‘NearGraduate’ example. 
82 {NG} 83 {NG) 
=‘(a) D(b) 
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ST {T(a),T(b) : G} 
Y\ 
54 {T(b) : NG} 
e):NGi 
FIGURE 9. Simplified ‘NearGraduate’ xample. 
This seems intuitively correct, since there are exactly two ways to satisfy the 
definition of ‘NearGraduate.’ The only problem, in intuitionistic logic, is that it is 
not possible to infer T(b) from G ti T(a) or to infer T(a) from G (= T(b). In classical 
logic, query (110) is also true, but for a very peculiar reason. The conclusion of this 
query is entailed in classical ogic from rule (108) alone! This means that everyone 
is a ‘NearGraduate’ in classical logic, no matter what courses they have taken! If 
our goal is the replication of commonsense reasoning, this is obviously not the 
correct result. 
An alternative model for the ‘NearGraduate’ example is depicted in Figure 9. 
Query (110) is true in this model, as we would expect, but the following query is 
also true: 
T(b) v T(a) =NG (III) 
Figure 9 thus appears to capture very well our commonsense intuitions about the 
definition of ‘NearGraduate’ in rules (108)-(109). What kind of a model is this? It 
cannot be interpreted as a Kripke model for intuitionistic logic, (K, 5, h,u), sine-, 
it violates the monotonicity condition on h. (Notice that NG is not forced at s7.) 
Instead, the structure in Figure 9 seems like a model for relevance logic [2, 151. 
The ‘NearGraduate’ example thus suggests that we generalize the circumscrip- 
tion of embedded implications from intuitionistic logic to relevance (or possibly 
linear) logic. Both relevance logic and linear logic have been proposed as alterna- 
tive foundations for logic programming [5, 251, and for certain examples this 
interpretation seems preferable to the intuitionistic interpretation. (For other 
examples, intuitionistic logic seems to be the better choice.) In a language restricted 
to embedded implications, the semilattice semantics for relevance logic due to 
Urquhart 1531 and the phase semantics for linear logic due to Girard [21] work very 
well, even though the semantics of full relevance logic or full linear logic is 
considered problematical. In fact, the structure in Figure 9 could be interpreted 
as an Urquhart model in which the semilattice is generated entirely by the base 
predicates, T(a) and T(b). To extend this analysis to more general examples, 
however, requires some additional work. The results in the present paper depend 
on various technical devices-the circumscription axiom, the definition of a homo- 
morphism, the construction of a final Kripke model, etc-and we would need 
analogues of these devices to extend our current results to weaker logics. We will 
discuss these issues in a subsequent paper. 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for bringing to my attention the results in Fangzhen Lin’s dissertation. 
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